50 CENTS AUGUST 1961

THE PROGRESSIVE

'THE AMERICANISTS' Gene Grove

THESE ARE THE AFRICANS Russell Warren Howe

'THE LAST BEST HOPE' Hugo L. Black

Office memo

EXPERIENCE over the years has convinced us that *The Progressive's* subscribers are as earnest and prolific a group of letter writers as any magazine could hope to have. The volume of mail directed to the Editor is consistently much more than we can publish. The People's Forum in *The Progressive* is easily the largest Letters-to-the-Editor department of all comparable publications, yet we can print only a portion of the correspondence we receive.

This hearty response from readers is all to the good; it creates a climate in which *The Progressive's* Editors and staff take considerable pleasure. We only regret that there isn't the time or the manpower available to acknowledge all letters from readers, particularly those we are unable to print for lack of space. Nevertheless, they are carefully read and deeply appreciated.

Now, we do not want, by any means, to discourage correspondence from our readers. But we would like to offer a few words of counsel: *The Progressive* finds most suitable for publication letters that represent a concise comment on a particular subject, stated as clearly and briefly as possible. We give preference to comments dealing with articles and editorials published in *The Progressive*, but we welcome, too, original ideas and viewpoints, and informative letters on matters not otherwise covered in the magazine.

In selecting letters for the People's Forum which touch on controversial subjects, it is our policy to present a representative proportion of the differing viewpoints expressed.

So we urge readers to write, but to keep letters as brief as possible, in order to give more subscribers an opportunity to present their views in the People's Forum.

•

Another type of correspondence which arrives in considerable volume—and which indicates our readers are not only letter writers but nomads—is the kind notifying us of a change of address. These reach an annual peak in late summer, just before the opening of the fall school semester. It is a great help to the circulation staff—indeed an essential item of information—to have the *old* address as well as the new one.

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Response to our recent special issue on Latin America has been excellent, and there is an unusually heavy sale of extra copies. Because of an especially large press run, copies are still available at fifty cents each, three for one dollar, ten for $2.50, and twenty-five for five dollars. All prices include postage. We will send the Latin America issue in bulk to a single address, or individually, if a mailing list is provided, at the same price. Send payment with your order to *The Progressive*, Madison, Wisconsin.

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The Progressive makes no attempt to exact complete conformity from its contributors, but rather welcomes a variety of opinions consistent with its general policies. Signed articles, therefore, do not necessarily represent the opinion of the management of the magazine.

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PROGRESSIVE

"YE SHALL KNOW THE TRUTH
AND THE TRUTH SHALL MAKE YOU FREE"

'Standing Firm' in Berlin

THE CURRENT crisis over Berlin, triggered by the Soviet Union's needling insistence on a German settlement, has provoked a perilous war of nerves in which both sides seem to reject an attempt at settlement by rules of reason. Both East and West, fearful that reasonableness will be interpreted as appeasement and surrender, are indulging in reckless rhetoric and assuming stubborn stances. In what history will surely regard as the midsummer madness of 1961, both sides have quickened the arms race and hurled threats of nuclear warfare at each other.

"Both East and West," wrote C. L. Sulzberger, European correspondent for the New York *Times*, "give every sign of being convinced that if they respectively show signs of reason these will be interpreted as signs of weakness. The result is a game of 'chicken' played with nuclear implications. 'Chicken,' it may be recalled, is the perverse and juvenile sport of driving two automobiles head on at each other to see which driver flinches first."

But having paid his critical respects to the intransigence on both sides, the careful observer, it seems to us, must concede in all fairness that unlike his conduct on so many previous occasions, the Soviet Union's Premier Nikita Khrushchev has displayed a greater degree of flexibility and an increased willingness to negotiate this conflict than one might suspect from the distorted reports in substantial portions of the American press and the warlike utterances of some of our more trigger-happy politicians.

For all the crude bombast and reckless belligerence that characterized some of his speeches on the Berlin crisis, Khrushchev was scrupulously careful on every occasion to leave the door open for negotiation. But this phase of the Soviet presentation was buried or ignored in much of the American press, which deceitfully created the impression that Khrushchev had thrown down a warlike ultimatum which we could not in honor accept.

Columnists and commentators were so carried away by their own distortions that they called for immediate military mobilization. Columnist Joseph Alsop, for example, spoke for many of his colleagues when he demanded "all possible preparations for war if need be." *The Wall Street Journal* contended that the West must take its stand on Berlin, "even risking war if it comes to that." The Pentagon, of course, concurred. *Newsweek* magazine, in a report of secret Pentagon deliberations that was so accurate President Kennedy turned the FBI loose to locate the source of the leak, reported the government was prepared to back up its position on Berlin "even at the risk of nuclear war." Richard Strout reported to the *Christian Science Monitor* that Secretary of State Dean Rusk "and other top officials now are warning selected groups that the nation is perhaps closer to nuclear war today than at any time since World War II." And Speaker Sam Rayburn, UPI reported, insisted we must hold onto West Berlin "even if it means a nuclear war with Russia."

Mauldin in The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

"Is That You Again?"

What had happened to explode this outbreak of comment so incendiary that its authors could contemplate the holocaust of nuclear war as a solution to the conflict over Berlin?

The reason, we are told, was the harsh, uncompromising character of Khrushchev's "ultimatum." But the Soviet leader's proposals, however distasteful, were nothing of the sort. They called for an early settlement of the problems of Berlin and a German peace treaty, but went on to say: "If for one reason or another, the government of the United States and other Western powers are not yet ready for this, an interim solution could be adopted for a definite period."

Does that sound like an ultimatum? Or does this from Khrushchev:

"Let us sit down at a table and calmly discuss all questions without resorting to threats. We propose the convocation of a peace conference and we shall go there with our draft treaty. Let the Western powers make their proposals, submit their drafts for a peace settlement. We shall discuss all proposals and accept those which will in the best way facilitate the strengthening of peace and which pay due regard to the interests and sovereignty of all states."

For all its sly ambiguities, this

clearly is not the language of an ultimatum. It is the opposite; it is a challenge to negotiate. To talk of military mobilization and to accept the imminence of nuclear war in response to these statements by Khrushchev seems to us the most reckless sort of rocket-rattling which, incidentally, plays squarely into Khrushchev's hands in his quest to mobilize world opinion behind the Soviet position.

Many Americans are convinced from what they read in their papers and hear on radio and television that Khrushchev has insisted that the West must withdraw from West Berlin and allow it to be swallowed up by East Germany. This, of course, is doubtless his ultimate goal, but we have no right to refuse to negotiate on the fallacious premise that this is what he demands now.

Far from insisting that West Berlin, "the bone in my throat," be taken over by Communist East Germany, Khrushchev has called for the establishment of a free city whose freedom would be guaranteed not only by Western powers, but by neutrals under the United Nations.

"The U.S.S.R.," read the relevant passage, "proposes that the most reliable guarantees should be established against intervention in the affairs of the free city by any state. As a guarantor of the free city, token contingents [which is all we have now] of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union could be stationed in West Berlin.

"Nor would the U.S.S.R. object to the stationing in West Berlin of troops of neutral countries under United Nations auspices for the same purpose. The status of the free city could be appropriately registered at the United Nations and sealed with the authority of that international organization. The Soviet side agrees to discuss any other measures which could guarantee the freedom and independence of West Berlin as a free city."

Now, one need not accept any or all of Khrushchev's scheme to recognize that, with all its booby-traps, it represents an offer to negotiate—not an ultimatum; that it holds out concessions to Western sensibilities and responsibilities; and that it is not a wholly one-sided, take-it-or-leave-it Soviet grab of West Berlin. The vital consideration is that it keeps the door open to negotiation and to the proffer of creative alternatives by the West.

It was with just this in mind that Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield braved the wrath of those who would—and did—call him appeaser by rising in the Senate to reject the concept that the present status of Berlin must remain forever frozen. In a memorable speech that somberly weighed the "ultimate implication" of "standing firm" in Berlin, the Montana Senator unequivocally spurned unilateral Soviet dictation of a Berlin settlement, and then warned his colleagues:

"We would prove little more than the inertia of Western leadership . . . if we insist that the status quo in Berlin is sacrosanct. We prove little more than the sterility of our diplomacy if we insist that the status quo in Berlin cannot be changed even by mutual agreement leading to a new situation, which is neither that which exists nor the alternative which the Soviet Union propounds. It seems to me that if we are to be not merely courageous, but intelligently courageous, that is precisely the course we must pursue. We must seek a third way in Berlin which may better serve the interests of all the parties concerned."

Senator Mansfield emphasized a concept almost wholly ignored by our press and our politicians in their single-minded insistence on "standing firm," whatever the consequences. Both sides, the Soviets and ourselves, he insisted, must reexamine the positions they have taken on Berlin in an effort to break free from the frozen patterns of the past.

"The responsibility which we have, and which the Soviet Union has," he said, "is not merely to reassert positions already assumed and which are obviously irreconcilable. The responsibility is to seek to determine whether or not there is a third way on Berlin which corresponds more accurately to the needs of Germany today, Europe today, and the world today—indeed, a third way which meets more fully the contemporary needs of both the Soviet Union and ourselves."

Unlike so many of his colleagues, and indeed President Kennedy as well, who talk so easily of "standing firm" over Berlin, the Montana Democrat soberly called on Congress and the country to evaluate the meaning of such a position. "The full implication of these four words—stand firm at Berlin," he warned, "had better be understood in the Senate, in the Congress, and in the nation. They had better be understood now.

"The range of this commitment extends from a beginning of words of firmness, to a midpoint of immense resources and enormous taxes and other sacrifices, to a final pledge of the lives and fortunes of every man, woman, and child in the nation. We are not engaged at Berlin with the fast draw and wax bullets of television anymore than the Russians are engaged in a harmless game of chess. In the last analysis we are engaged now, as we have been in Berlin, with the whole future of the United States. In this day and age and in this situation, the words 'standing firm' carry no other than this ultimate implication."

Not content merely to argue the need for a third way, Senator Mansfield proposed his own plan for a solution—the creation of a free city of both Berlins, East and West, "to be held in trust and in peace by some international authority until such time as it is again the capital of [a united] Germany. Let the routes of access to this whole city be garrisoned by international peace teams in the effective pattern of those now operating between Israel and the Arab States. Let this interim status of free city be guaranteed by the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries."

Mansfield was quick to anticipate the argument that Khrushchev would not consent. Khrushchev's reactions, whatever they may be, he said in pounding home a point long emphasized in *The Progressive*, "do not absolve us from our rational responsibilities to ourselves and to the world in this situation."

The concept of an interim free city for all Berlin is an arresting and imaginative proposal. While we have grave doubts that such a free city

could be made a viable economic entity, we believe the concept is worth exploring, as is any proposal that will lower the tension temperature. What we like most about Mansfield's suggestion is its recognition that we have to rethink the whole problem in fresh terms, that we can no longer cling to rigid positions that defy the law of change, and that the only hope of steering a course that avoids the "ultimate implication" of deadlock—nuclear war—is to develop affirmative alternatives for the bargaining table.

Senator Mansfield was speaking for himself, not the Kennedy Administration, when he made his speech in the Senate. We can conceive of no more hopeful development in the Administration's conduct of foreign affairs than for it to embrace the motives that moved the Senator and the spirit in which he called for public debate and advanced the basis for fruitful discussion. The tragedy of the past few months is that there has been so little that could pass as debate of a great public issue. Too many Americans, including members of Congress, have been intimidated by the fear of being labeled appeasers if they dared raise their voices to challenge the everlasting sanctity of the status quo in Berlin. Perhaps they can find needed support in the response made by Walter Lippmann *(see Page 18)* when asked if his emphasis on negotiation might not lead to charges of appeasement.

"You can't decide those questions of life or death for the world by epithets like appeasement," he said. "I don't agree with people who think we have to go out and shed a little blood to prove we're virile men."



Progress

We of *The Progressive* are said by some of our cynical critics to be incurable believers in the concept of human progress, and perhaps we are. But we confess there are dark moments when our faith falters. This happened the other day when we came across some especially idiotic speeches inserted in the *Congressional Record* by members of Congress who are even now actively campaigning for reelection. Communication between Congressmen and their constituents, we brooded, has fallen to a new low, especially when compared with the great Philippics of the past.

Shortly afterward, however, our faith in progress was restored—in a perverse sort of way. We were reading Leo Katcher's *The Big Bankroll* (Harper & Brothers), the story of crime and corruption in New York City in the days of Arnold Rothstein, the notorious gambler. The author tells the story of a Congressional campaign at the turn of the century. The antagonists were, in this corner, Congressman Timothy Campbell, Tammany's Irish hack and a veteran of many campaigns, and, in this corner, Anthony Rinaldo, a first generation American of Italian descent running on the Republican ticket.

Campbell had but one short speech which he delivered everywhere:

"There is two issues. A national issue and a local issue. First, the national issue.

"There is two bills before the country—the Mills Bill and the McKinley Bill. The Mills Bill is for free trade with everything free. The McKinley Bill is for protection, with nothing free. Do you want everything free or do you want to pay for everything?

"Having thus disposed of the national issue, I will now devote myself to the local issue, which is the Dago, Rinaldo. He is from Italy. I am from Ireland. Are you in favor of Italy or Ireland?

"Having thus disposed of the local issue, and thanking you for your attention, I will now retire."

P.S. Campbell won a smashing victory.

P.P.S. The big change in our time would seem to be that our candidates are obliged to cope with the international issue whereas Congressman Campbell, in those halcyon days of isolation, was required to analyze and debate only the major conflicts as they showed up in the national and local issues he discussed. From some of the things we read in the *Congressional Record*, at least a few of the descendants of Congressman Campbell find the international issue as lacking in complications as he found the national and local issues of his time. "Khrushchev is from Russia. I am from America. Are you in favor of Russia or America? Having thus disposed of the international issue, and thanking you for your attention, I will now retire." You may think this isn't quite fair, and perhaps it isn't, but then you don't read some of the stuff in the *Congressional Record* that we do.

Words & Deeds

In no area of American foreign policy has the Kennedy Administration struck so hopeful and affirmative a note from the beginning as it has in its presentation of the problems of Latin America. Its eloquent emphasis on the social and economic character of the challenge south of the border has evoked a wide and enthusiastic response in this country and in Central and South America. That is why the shock was so great when, a fortnight or so ago, the President sent Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and a retinue of generals to Capitol Hill to urge the immediate approval of substantially more *military* aid for the poverty-ridden nations of Latin America.

Two of the Administration's best friends who happen to be two of our best authorities on Latin America promptly exploded in the Senate.

"It makes me wonder how foolish we can get in our foreign aid program," said Senator Wayne L. Morse, Oregon Democrat.

"This is just plain stupid," said Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, Minnesota Democrat.

McNamara and his band of generals called on Congress to wipe out two restrictions on military aid to Latin America adopted in 1959. One of these had put a ceiling on the total amount that could be spent for military aid; the other prohibited the use of U.S. military aid for internal security purposes.

President Kennedy, responding to pressures from the Pentagon, now seems convinced that a big danger in Latin America is the threat of internal subversion generated by forces operating out of Castro's Cuba. And yet for six months and many thousands of words, the President and his aides have insisted, correctly in our judgment, that our one great hope of preventing the spread af Castroism was to build the social and economic foundations of political democracy.

Cuba itself provides the most deadly rebuttal to the President's program. The United States had poured millions of dollars into arming General Batista's military establishment against "internal subversion," but its 30,000 to 40,000 heavily armed troops collapsed when confronted by Fidel Castro's 1,000 guerrillas—who had the support of the people.

The unhappy history of Latin America in our time demonstrates all too convincingly that U.S. military aid has served to strengthen the very forces whose feudal policies maintain and magnify the conditions which provide fertile ground for popular demand for extremist solutions. Representative Barratt O'Hara, Illinois Democrat, summed up the case against the new approach when he said the Pentagon is asking for "a blank check from Congress to maintain governments in power; these governments can be strong only if cherished in the minds and hearts of the people."

This was once the basic position of the President. His friends hope he will abandon the old frontier of the generals in the Pentagon for the New Frontier to which he once beckoned us.

Business Looks at Health

One of the most frequently heard—and superficially persuasive—arguments invoked against the Kennedy Administration's medical aid for the aged plan is that the great majority of Americans—130 million—are already protected by private health insurance plans. Recently the conservative magazine, *Business Week*, exposed the argument as a fraud by simply applying, in its customary businesslike way, the familiar yardstick of dollars and cents.

These 130 million private insurance policyholders, said *Business Week*, "pay better than 5.5 billion dollars a year in premiums and they get back 4.5 billion a year in benefits . . . but . . . U.S. people spend on the care of their health . . . around $20 billion a year. Thus, the benefits cover less than one quarter of the total bill."

"More important," continued this voice of business, "only about twenty per cent of the nation's population has any broad coverage against the cost of illness . . . More than forty million have no protection at all . . . More than one hundred million have insurance only against the costs of hospitalization and carry none against the costs of doctors' services."

The growth of private insurance plans has slowed to almost a standstill, largely because of premium increases averaging upwards of seven per cent each year for more than a decade. Insurance cost increases are in turn directly traceable to the astronomical rise in hospital costs, thoroughly detailed by Selig Greenberg in the April and May issues of *The Progressive*. After examining the factors that have driven costs so high in the nation's seven thousand hospitals (worth $16 billion, and with one million employes), *Business Week* observed:

"Any businessman might assume considerable planning had gone into their growth in the last several decades. He would be wrong. New hospitals are built, old ones expanded, and millions of dollars are spent on equipping them—all with hardly any planning."

Mushrooming suburbs, bursting with local pride, compete with each other in developing hospital facilities in blithe disregard of existing, often underused, facilities nearby. Hospitals within communities unnecessarily duplicate costly, specialized equipment. *Business Week* hinted, without actually lapsing into heresy, that order might gradually develop out of chaos if the Federal government, through the Social Security approach, had a direct interest in the insurance business. Through its influence, persuasion, and guidance, and the Administration's emphasis on out-patient treatment, hospital services might be coordinated on a community-wide, or even statewide, basis. If so, costs would be lowered, the rise in insurance premiums halted, and the private companies would find new markets in which to expand.

As important as any feature of the proposed legislation are the provisions for at-home nursing care, and nursing home treatment for patients whose health needs do not require vastly more expensive hospital facilities. Most private hospital insurance plans aggravate the hospital crisis by requiring hospitalization of patients before payment of claims. A Federal plan along broader lines might well result in a revision of private insurance schemes—and lower costs.

No Relief in Sight

In contrast to the American Medical Association's broadside blast at the Federal medical plan as "socialized medicine," and its alarums that the government is about to "take over" all medicine, *Business Week* takes a reasonable and realistic approach. Pointing out that the present crisis has come about in large measure because of the swift-paced revolution in medical technology, *Business Week* concluded:

"The institutions that have served well in the past have to change if they're to keep pace and these social changes come more slowly. But they do come—and the result is usually a combination of government and private endeavor. This will probably be the path the United States will follow in hunting for better means to help meet the mounting cost of illness."

But this is one of the New Frontiers we are not likely to reach soon. Speaker Sam Rayburn announced as this was being written that there would be no House action on the Administration bill in this session of Congress. There are not enough votes to bring the plan out of the powerful—and conservative—House Ways and Means Committee. In the meantime the health and hospital crisis deepens.

'The Americanists'

by GENE GROVE

This is the first of two articles on the John Birch Society. The author spent several months investigating the organization for the New York Post *and traveled to a number of cities to observe the Society's operations firsthand. His book,* Inside the John Birch Society, *will be published soon.*—THE EDITORS.

ETERNAL VIGILANCE is the price of secrecy, Robert Henry Winborne Welch, Jr., frequently counsels his followers. "Communist infiltrators," he warns, "could bog us down in interminable disagreements, schisms, and feuds before we ever become seriously effective." Non-Communist infiltrators, judging by my own experience, pose nearly equal dangers.

The security system of the John Birch Society, however, has not yet attained that degree of efficiency demonstrated by, say, the government of the United States, which Welch estimates is forty to sixty per cent under "effective Communist control." But then the Society does not have at its disposal the services of J. Edgar Hoover, whose nomination as Attorney General was a pre-election demand by Welch—curiously, considering Hoover's high place in what Welch considers a demonstrably imperfect internal security system. The demand was made of Richard Nixon, who ignored it, and as things turned out, of course, the candidate was as powerless to further Hoover's fortunes as is Welch.

If the John Birch Society cannot successfully screen out the potential deviationists intent upon schism, it is quite possible that the rigors of entering the Society—rigors grounded principally in a certain pervasive ineptitude among its members—discourage many a dilettante of the radical right. For those whose normal association is not with Adolphe Menjou, T. Coleman Andrews, Spruille Braden, Archibald Roosevelt, Clarence Manion, various former presidents of the National Association of Manufacturers, or others high in the councils of Robert Welch, there are many paths to the truth, but none without its hazards.

The direct approach, which is the first one I took, is a journey to Belmont, Massachusetts, hard by Boston and Cambridge, where the headquarters of the John Birch Society shares a modern, two-story brick building with the local office of the John Hancock Life Insurance Company. The sign on the building says *American Opinion,* the name of Welch's magazine.

Friendly visitors are met with civility. The doubtful, however, are met with suspicion, and the suspicious with hostility. Known enemies are barred. An open face and the appearance of a closed mind, however, opened the door for me to the upper room of the Society, which is in the basement. There I was steered to what is known, in one of the Society's many euphemisms, as a "coordinator." Coordinators, in more direct language, are paid organizers, scattered about the country according to the vagaries of need and finance. One who works out of the Belmont headquarters is Tom Hill, a Bostonian with a Southern drawl, a thin-haired man in his late thirties.

My trip to headquarters and my visit with coordinator Hill did not entirely solve my problem as a prospective recruit. I still needed a chapter to join, although Hill, if pressed, probably would have accepted my annual dues of $24. (Women get by for half price, a discrimination never explained.) Hill, however, does not ask visitors to join the Society. He is a talker by nature rather than an organizer. A former teacher, Hill is more interested in giving instruction in the ways of righteousness than in collecting dues, and, with a teacher's patience, he answers every question.

Has the publicity, I asked, to which the Society recently has been subjected hurt?

"Look there," he replied, waving an easy arm about him at a basement crammed with girls and office machines. "We're busier than we've ever been. The publicity"—his voice

lowered—"has hurt some, but it's helped, too. It's brought us to the attention of a lot of people who never heard of us and who want to join."

How did Hill himself become interested?

"I'm from Boston, but I went to

college and taught school in Texas." His drawl became more pronounced.

"I saw the terrible distortions and omissions of the history books—I taught history—and the way they ignored the Socialist and Communist infiltration of America, the way they failed to teach the things that really made this country great—free enterprise, individual initiative—and the way the National Education Association was taking over the school system. And Mr. Welch seemed to have the right idea, so I went to work for him."

While talking, Hill bustled about the basement collecting printed material—*The Blue Book,* the Society's basic text; *The White Book,* a collection of the Society's monthly bulletins; *American Opinion,* the occasionally published magazine, all available at a price—and explained away a random copy of the Communist *Worker:* "Mr. Welch likes to see what the other side is doing." In parting, although he had made no effort to enlist my membership, he dropped a hint. "Write to Tom Davis, Bertmor Drive, Stamford, Connecticut. If you can get ten people together, he'll come down and talk to you."

Mr. Davis, it turned out, will, indeed, talk to groups of ten or more, but he is a busy man and has no time to waste on the saving of the innocents. His answer to my letter, directed as Hill had instructed, stated:

"At such a presentation we want only those individuals who are informed, at least to some degree, about the Conspiracy. Also, because of the length of the presentation (about three and one-half hours), anyone invited should know how long it will take.

"We are looking to build our membership with dedicated and zealous Americanists. As Mr. Welch said some time ago, 'We mean business, every step of the way.' We do not want members who need an education in Communism, and, although this is necessary, we just do not feel time permits it. It is our firm conviction that the time for debate was long ago, and that the time for action is here."

Inspired by the quotation from Welch and firm in the conviction that action is a substitute for education, Davis finds that his enthusiasm and devotion make his time quite valuable. It would be, he told me, at least a month before he could get around to meeting any newcomers to the crusade.

As a potential crusader unable to restrain his zeal for a month, I found the only path open to me was to attempt to meet some fortunate soul already a member. In New York, newspapers had published lists of the members of the council of the John Birch Society, a powerless advisory board from which Welch sometimes accepts advice, and of the Committee of Endorsers, a nebulous group whose only function is to lend the weight of members' names to the Society in much the fashion that, say, Eleanor Roosevelt might let her name be used in some worthy cause. A telephone and a fixed purpose are all the other equipment needed.

Mrs. Seth Milliken answered my call with a pleasant voice. "Yes," she said one evening from her apartment in the East Sixties. "I'm sure we'd love to have you. We're all so interested in the marvelous work Mr. Welch is doing" (Society members almost without exception speak of the work of Mr. Welch rather than the work of the Society) "and I'm sure we'll welcome anyone who is sincerely interested in the work. I'll call and let you know when there will be a meeting."

But Mrs. Milliken never called.

After a few days, I tried again, going down the list of Society leaders. At Merwin K. Hart's office, a brusque secretary directed my inquiry—as she does all others—to the John Birch Society, Belmont 78, Massachusetts. Spruille Braden, George M. Tisdale, T. I. Parkinson, Jr., all gave me the same answer: "Write to the John Birch Society, Belmont 78, Massachusetts."

But Vice Admiral Charles S. Freeman, U.S.N. (Retired), was more responsive. His voice was warm and friendly.

"Why, yes, I believe I can help you."

He was concerned.

"Where do you live? Would you rather join a chapter on Long Island? I believe we have chapters in Mineola and Hempstead."

He was in error. According to a Society coordinator, there are no active chapters on Long Island, although a dozen "are in the process of forming."

Admiral Freeman was informative.

"Most of us in Chapter Twenty-six—it's the oldest chapter in the New York area—are businessmen. We meet at five p.m., right after business, so that we can go on home from the meeting. Would that be convenient?"

The Admiral is also inefficient. The day of the telephone conversation, he wrote a letter which said ". . . it appears best that you attend the meeting of the John Birch Chapter Twenty-six on Tuesday, May 9, at five p.m. as a guest, if that meets with your convenience." But he neglected to say where the chapter meets.

The error was rectified by a pro-



cedural reversal, however. Merwin K. Hart, the chapter leader, who earlier had directed me to write to Belmont, now wrote an almost identical invitation, this one with the address, and where the panting recruit once had no invitation now I had two.

If I had become disheartened by the lack of interest in a potential member displayed in Belmont, if I had been disenchanted by the laborious task and uncertain reward involved in trying to make contact

with a member, at least I had been spared—for the moment—the exhaustion of attending one of the meetings directed by such men as Hill and Davis.

The John Birch Society makes stern demands of its members. But perhaps the sternest is that which comes before a member's admission to the brotherhood—the minimum of three deadly hours required to get through the recruiting spiel of its coordinators.

For more than two hours of this time, the neophyte must sit watching a film which shows only the face of Robert Welch as he reads the text of the Birch bible, *The Blue Book*, of which Welch is the author. There are, however, two dramatic high points, both repeated several times, which relieve the monotony of the motion picture—Welch leaning closer to the camera to emphasize a point, and the pauses for reel changes.

"We are out to get a million members truly dedicated to the things in which we believe," Welch said when he founded the organization at a meeting in Indianapolis on December 9, 1958. And one must be truly dedicated to endure the film.

Signing up a million members seems a rather ambitious project, but Welch set himself relatively modest short-range goals: 30,000 members by the end of 1959, 100,000 by the end of 1961. He has admitted that the Society did not get "anywhere near" 30,000 members by the end of its first year. "Our growth in numbers, with the dedication we require," he said, "has been far slower than we originally expected." He claims, but does not support with figures, that the Society has been doubling its membership "every three or four months."

The sole optimism Welch permits himself in a world where Communism, weakness, treachery, and conspiracy are everywhere, is with respect to the John Birch Society. "Our growth in strength, especially in proportion to our numbers," he consoles his little band, "has been far above our most hopeful anticipation." Despite this joy through strength, the John Birch Society will not achieve a 100,000 membership by the end of the year, probably not even half that number.

The recruiting meetings begin, invariably, with a pledge of allegiance to the flag, then turn immediately to the test of faith, the film. For those occasions when the group is not blessed with a projector, the lecture also has been immortalized on tape. On film or on tape Welch is firm, authoritative, even demanding—a posture he maintains only in a friendly atmosphere. In personal appearances at public meetings, where there is the possibility of harassment, Welch is a nervous note-shuffler, his eyes warily searching the assemblage for hecklers.

Justus in The Minneapolis Star

Fruit for Nikita

But in privately recorded sound or sight he remains self-assured. "I personally have been studying the problem [Communism] increasingly for about nine years and practically full time for the past three years. And entirely without pride, but in simple thankfulness, let me point out that a lifetime of business experience should have made it easier for me to see the falsity of the economic theories on which Communism is based more readily than might some scholar coming into that study from the academic cloisters; while a life-time of interest in things academic, especially world history, should have given me an advantage over many businessmen in more readily seeing the sophistries of dialectic materialism.

"So I have felt, rightly or wrongly, that my grasp of Communist purposes, and even of their methods, should have been more rapid than that of some of my patriotic friends who have gradually become staunch anti-Communists."

His credentials presented, Welch launches on his interpretation of history and economics. So there will be no mistake, he makes it clear right at the beginning that, in his mind, Socialism, Communism, "collectivism," and the New Deal are the same evil masked by a confusion of names.

The world is slipping rapidly away from the grasp of the "Americanists." Such countries as India, Turkey, the Philippines, Iceland, Norway, and Venezuela are lost. The lonely outposts of freedom in the world are Spain, Portugal, the Dominican Republic, and the Union of South Africa. In the United States, Hawaii is under Communist control and "the whole slogan of 'civil rights' as used to make trouble in the South today, is an exact parallel to the slogan of 'agrarian reform' which they used in China."

Our danger, he warns, "remains almost entirely internal, from Communist influences right in our midst and treason right in our government" while "the American people are being persuaded that our danger is from the outside, is from Russian military superiority . . . under the excuse of preparing to match that military might, of defending ourselves from this threat of outside force; in other words, under the guise of fighting Communism, we are being stampeded into the biggest jump ever towards, and perhaps the final jump right into, Socialism and then the Communist camp."

One learns from the film that things are never what they seem. Sputnik, for example, was not a scientific achievement, but a cold war weapon designed to expand U.S. spending for defense, push taxes higher, unbalance the budget, create inflation, bring on price and wage controls, increase "socialistic controls" over our economy, centralize power in Washington and eliminate states' rights, bring about Federal control of the educational system, create an anti-war philosophy, and facilitate the surrender of the United States.

To fight this diabolical scheme,

then, Welch offers a militantly anti-Communist organization, the John Birch Society, under dynamic personal leadership—his.

Tom Hill journeyed down from Belmont to Hartford, Connecticut, recently to hold one of his meetings, greeting me and his other guests in a small meeting room in a South Side social club barren except for an American flag, straight-backed chairs, his projector and screen. After showing the film, he took the floor to explain the ten points of Welch's action program against Communism. If the program seemed like something less than a terrible answer to the terrible threat of Communism, it must be remembered that the essential threat is internal and that blows against the Supreme Court and the Welfare State are, in essence, blows against the Conspiracy.

The Society's program, he said, includes the establishment of reading rooms, "much like Christian Science reading rooms but small and inexpensive," for conservative publications; expanding the circulation of such ultra right wing periodicals as *Human Events* and *National Review;* widening the audience of such radio commentators as Fulton Lewis, Jr., and Dan Smoot; organizing letter-writing campaigns; organizing front groups such as the current "Committee to Impeach Earl Warren;" setting up a conservative speakers' bureau; setting up anti-Communist governments-in-exile; and helping conservative political candidates.

Another aim, he said, was "to start shocking the American people . . . by exposure, which is why the Communists just had to get rid of McCarthy, and went to such extreme lengths to do so." Unfortunately, the Society would not be blessed with the subpoena privileges or other Congressional powers of McCarthy, "which makes our job far more difficult."

One of Welch's proposals concerns his *American Opinion* (the magazine originally was named *One Man's Opinion* and the title change is not atypical). He would run articles composed of questions directed at suspected Communists "which would be devastating in their implications."

"The question technique," says Welch, "when skillfully used in this manner, is mean and dirty. But the Communists we are after are meaner and dirtier, and too slippery for you to put your fingers on them in the ordinary way—no matter how much they look and act like prosperous members of the local Rotary Club." There are dangers in this course however: "We have to be prepared from the beginning for a lot of smearing, as I have already said; and possibly also, no matter how carefully our job was done, for a lot of nuisance libel suits."

When Hill had finished explaining this and other portions of the film, he opened the meeting to questions. There were no questions concerning Welch's trial-by-innuendo proposal but there was another interesting colloquy.

"Are there any Negro members in the Society?" he was asked.

Yes, said Hill, there certainly were. Why, he himself had only recently organized several all-Negro chapters in Texas.

His questioner was persistent. Were there any integrated chapters?

"That would be up to the local chapters themselves," Hill said. There are no Society rules on the matter. North Carolina-born Robert Welch insists he is without racial prejudice, although he denounces "enforced integration."

The inevitable question was posed: a woman asked Hill if Welch had, as she had heard, called former President Eisenhower a "card-carrying Communist."

Hill replied that Welch "had never said that." He said Welch had charged in a private letter that Communism had made great strides forward in America while Eisenhower was President.

While it seems true that Welch had not used the exact phrase, "card-carrying Communist," it is clear he had charged in his strange, 300-page "letter" known as "The Politician," or the "Black Book," essentially just that, and in much stronger language than that "Communism had made great strides forward." Thus, he wrote of the former President: ". . . to put it bluntly, I personally think that he has been sympathetic to ultimate Communist aims, realistically willing to use Communist means to help them achieve their goals, knowingly accepting and abiding by Communist orders, and consciously serving the Communist conspiracy for all of his adult life."

As new members, who finally had found their devious ways to the light of Robert H. W. Welch, Jr., were signing their application blanks after the Hartford meeting, Hill noticed a group of us drifting out the door. He called a warning to us:

"We are alarmists and we are going to fight. You can leave here tonight without joining the John Birch Society, and without purchasing *The Blue Book*. But if you do, you will go to bed tonight and when you wake up tomorrow you will not remember that there is a Communist conspiracy."

We decided to take our chances on the morning after, and walked out the door.

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These Are the Africans

by RUSSELL WARREN HOWE

Leopoldville

AT LAST count, there were twenty-six African nations. All except one, Mauritania, has a voice in the United Nations, which now has ninety-nine members. With ten per cent of the world's population, and twenty-five per cent of the power in the United Nations, Africa is today the new element in global politics. Moreover, while other continents have ceased to yield new nations, Africa is still producing. Sierra Leone and perhaps Tanganyika can be added to the list this year. Next year will be the turn of Ruanda-Urundi—which may split into two nations. Others on the list for nationhood before long are: Algeria, Uganda, Kenya, Nyasaland, the Rhodesias, and eventually the Spanish and Portuguese territories.

The leaders who control the destinies of these countries may bicker wildly among themselves, and usually do, but they have certain features in common with which other governments must learn to live. There is not likely to be an all-African bloc, but there are already some African political archetypes. Though Ethiopeans and Congolese and Tunisians and Nigerians are as different from one another as Swedes and Poles and Italians and Irish, their ways of thinking, their principles—or lack of them—and their political vices and virtues bear uncanny similarities, with the differences being more in degree than in substance.

A country usually has the government it deserves, even if it does not always have the government it wants. The types of government prevalent in Africa correspond to the nature of their electorates. What have Africans elected governments for, over the past five years? In the great majority of cases, they have voted to gain independence. This begs the question as to what Africans expect from independence.

At the modest intellectual levels at which the African peasant lives, his conception of independence is far less noble than we would like to think. Although Africans admire positive thought, and love to cite proverbs which show evidence of this quality, most Africans are negative thinkers, at least as much as other people: they are more readily against something than for something. Another cardinal weakness of the African is materialism. A third characteristic is the leader cult. A fourth is an inability to "carry things through"—a lack of really driving ambition.

These, of course, are generalizations, and the first reaction of a reader may well be to see how these characteristics appear in peoples of other countries—of the West in particular. We are more anti-Nazi than pro-democratic; we fight harder in defense than attack. We are also a materialistic society. As for leader-cults, we either collect royal families or Presidential handshakes. As for "drive," most people, in our society, do not have the push to get their dreams off the ground.

The difference with Africa is one of degree. The counter-balances are missing, and in Africa these vices or weaknesses consequently go to extremes. In our Western societies, many people are positive enough to devote their lives to constructive causes. In Africa, almost no one feels strongly about promoting honesty in public office, and what resentment there is at the considerable amount of corruption is jealousy more often than shock.

There are so many checks on our Western materialism that they are hardly worth mentioning. Although we proudly boast that we drive a hard bargain, most of us are slightly ashamed of the fact. But the African admires a successful profiteer. Our cult of leaders may prompt us to give rather too much attention to the Kennedy children, and pictures of British royalty may be the easiest story to sell to readers of *Paris-Match*, but our leaders are anything but above criticism, and when they fall from grace they fall hard. In Africa, the leader is surrounded by a charisma which is close to being religious: Caesar can do no wrong; he is the embodiment of the soul of the tribe, the nation, and to smite him is to smite yourself.

As for the "push" quality, our weakest-willed, most unambitious citizens are dynamos compared to their counterparts in Africa. This may be just a lack of protein, but whatever it is we have to remember that it is there.

Most Africans in the colonial condition are deeply conscious of two grievances: a sense of inferiority to the colonial master which the master, until recent years, did nothing much to diminish and in many cases sought to encourage; and poverty. For the last five or ten years, most African countries have been undergoing a program of African promotion which makes it not only easier for the Afri-

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can to get a degree and a responsible post than it would be for a European (in Africa or Europe), but also tends to encourage him to exercise his inferiority feelings by pretending he is more "equal" than a number of factors will permit.

No one can seriously doubt that all peoples are potentially equal, and an African brought up in Paris will have nothing to hold him back except the unjust stigma about his color: he will, in fact, be French, just as the ex-Nigerians and ex-Somalis of Tiger Bay are indubitably Welsh. But the African child brought up in the old, primitive Africa—as most African children are—learns his lessons by rote; he acquires the outer, academic patina of a culture, but finds the door to its inner realities is permanently locked. The West Africa-trained jurist son of an illiterate Ashanti farmer, surrounded, from his childhood on, with the tribal reality, will never be an Earl Warren, or even a Philadelphia lawyer. The jump from the dark ages to the nuclear era is more than can be made by the lonely mind, working more or less unaided. The educated African child of educated parents starts off with a far better chance; and it is the better educated, most qualified Africans, the ones who surpass the "averages" of the rest of the world, who run government departments and teach at universities, who are most aware—tragically so—of their limitations; frustrated, they finally are forced into arid searches for a storied and cultural past which Africa, unfortunately, does not have.

The other grievance is poverty. Given the relative lack of drive, most Africans conceive of the answer to poverty in terms of easy money. Add the infallible leader, the one who can do everything for his followers, and what Africans seem to expect from independence is a negative opportunity, not so much to rise to Nobel Prize-winning heights—though of course a few do have such positive ambitions—as to wreak revenge on that white tribe that does carry off these prizes, and which does produce better engineers and accountants and rubber-planters. The leader they want should give them this opportunity of revenge, this opportunity to solve the individual's material problems without his putting in much effort of his own. They cannot conceive of the effort involved in getting where those they envy get—nor, alas, are they capable of making it.

Revenge on whites is the dominant characteristic in many Africans' attitude to the world. It is a defect less marked in Ghana than anywhere else, and relatively subdued in French Africa. But it is a motive force in Nigeria—which in most ways is more politically advanced than Ghana or French Africa—and it is almost a religion in the Congo and in other countries in the Capricorn half of Africa.

These are, of course, generalizations again, and most liberals will hasten to say that if Capricorn Africa is more anti-white than Africa north of the Equator it is because Africans there had a rougher time from their white governments. This truth does not abolish the other—that racism is an aspect of the African mind, and particularly of the south-of-Equator African mind, which we must take into consideration in our dealings with this continent.

Exaggerated materialism is the second most dominant characteristic, and this seems to be universal. On this issue, the liberal will say that the poor have a reason to be materialistic. This is true. But the Sicilian peasant or the Irish fisherman will hesitate strongly to improve his lot by dishonesty. There is little in African ethics which reproves illicit gain, or invokes—except in matters of life and death—an ideal of social responsibility.

The leaders with whom we deal know their people well. Most leaders in most countries do; but in Africa, where society is relatively more leveled, former Paramount Chief Houphouet-Boigny, now president of the Ivory Coast, has a good deal more in common with the laborers on his home plantation than General de Gaulle has with his palace servants.

The African leader is very much aware of the *rage d'inferiorite*, and of the buyableness of a people who feel a burning need for Chevrolets more than they feel a burning need for, say, a wife to love or an achievement to leave behind them. The leader's awareness of these characteristics has to dictate his policies. Given the charisma he inherits by heading a party which can win elections, he can be almost as authoritarian as he likes. African chiefs have always been despots, in some degree, and the African mind has been conditioned for centuries to respect a tyrant. But as tyrannical as the African president can allow himself to be, he has to deliver the psychological consolation which racism gives, and he has to talk—and if possible act—in terms of easy money. He can only rely on his lieutenants if he pays them handsome bribes for being his supporters. Let us face a fact, however much it disturbs our desires to blame everything on ourselves: could slavery have existed if African materialism had not been of the most venal kind?

The need to respond to his electorate's characteristics, and the fact that he shares them himself, produces an archetype of African leader who is racist himself in varying degrees, usually corrupt, believes in his own semi-sacredness, and is sensitive, to a morbid pitch, to anything that dims its shine. He is a seeker of expedients—Lumumba went from Detwiler to Khrushchev in seven days—with little basic ideology except the determination to remain in power.

All African leaders, of course, do not share these defects to the same degree. The French-African leaders, with a political polish acquired in long years as legislators in France's own Assembly, are less expedient-seeking and less anti-white—in other words, more self-confident. Tunisia's President Bourguiba is a statesman by any standards. Moderation and reflection temper decisions in the Sudan, and when Ethiopia acquires a more democratic government it will probably be one of the best in Africa.

But what can go wrong, in a situation like Africa today, with such—dare one say it?—primitively-motivated electors, and leaders with such tarnished psyches, is more apparent than what might, with a little luck, go right.

President Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast is a realistic man and gives his country as good an administration as is possible with the ma-

terial available. But for his people to question him is so unthinkable (does one question God?) that he is at least as ruthless in dealing with his opposition as is Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana. This is a general pattern. Sober French-African leaders who inspire confidence in their Western interlocutors rule their electorates with an iron hand.

African peoples, like all peoples who accept authoritarian rule, unwittingly encourage their leaders to go too far, until finally the lid boils off. Revolutions, therefore, on the old South American pattern, are liable to be features of the new Africa. Only the modest size of present-day African armies is delaying this development. Some tyrants are better than others, but we must know that we are dealing with tyrants, with all that this involves.

Corruption is an enormous issue in Africa. We have to accept that the most Westernized leaders with whom we deal are, in most cases, abominably venal men. Sekou Toure of Guinea is a shining exception, a man with an ideology. He is a tyrant, but an honest one—honest, too, in politics, according to his lights and his political beliefs, which he was led to because we—the white Western face that once dominated Guinea—are opposed to them.

We must expect to be treated a little less than justly by these African leaders—whether we live in their countries or merely trade goods or pacts with them. This feature will be worst where preparation for independence has been most neglected. The Congo, by its dramatic exaggerations, puts this and other defects under the microscope.

The tribal quarrels which historically divide Africa, the distrust for persons who do not speak your African language and whose own language you do not understand, develop to an alarming degree when the previous colonial administration has not done what it could to unify the country—when it has failed in the creation of a professional and business middle class, whose common interests outweigh the old tribal differences, and the creation of a nationwide political system in which party loyalties cross tribal lines. The Congo is the best example of what goes wrong when tribalism is left unchecked, but most of Capricorn Africa will demonstrate this characteristic—which is far from dead in the more advanced societies of West Africa.

The white-baiting which is perhaps the most dramatic feature of the Congolese provincial scene, must be expected elsewhere. If this drives the European investor, technician, and even missionary out, where can the cash and know-how come from, except from the Communist countries? The Communists are white also—the Chinese would be white in Africa—but they will probably take the risk. After all, can those they will send to work in Africa refuse to go? The lynching and even rape of a few hundred of these new *colons* would be a small price to pay for a Communist empire in Africa. This is carrying the dangers to the furthest extremes, but extremes are common here. In Africa, one lives with extremes of everything—of poverty, of absurdity, of violence. There are even extremes of inadequacy, in a situation as fluid and dangerous as this.

Much of what has gone wrong—and the worse that surely is still to come in certain areas—can be imputed to colonialism, with its sometimes brutal, and always frustrating, racist philosophy. It is quite possible that if, by some miracle of history, Africa had been swept out of its backwater and into the Twentieth Century *without* a colonial period, things would be greatly different. The holocaust apparently awaiting South Africa is an obvious product of colonialism in its most excessive form. But much is simply Africa: attitudes here, after sixty years of colonial rule, are considerably more "complexed" than in India, which had 300 years of submission to the British Crown. Let us not be paternalistic: all is not well along the African shore, and the abolition of colonialism is not the whole solution. Let us not take too much comfort, either: the world in which Africans are forced to live is a world of our making, not theirs.

What can we do to help our own selfish, laudable desire to bring democracy to Africa, to save ourselves from a third world war, and to save the Africans from themselves until they produce the generation that can see their own condition, and the world, more clearly? Perhaps nothing can be done, and perhaps in the eyes of the oracle the great battle is already lost and already won. But while we must pay at least lip-service to the need to preserve African traditions—a country must have tradition if it is to build something else—we should, perhaps, be less modest about the advantages of Westernization. The Africa of tomorrow will be "sophisticated"—as colonials say of Africans who resemble Europeans more than their cousins out in the bush—or it will not be anything. Perhaps the best that we in the rich "advanced" world can do for the African states is to give them as many scholarships and training grants as possible—thousands upon thousands of them—to enable their elites to be trained among us. One thing we can be sure of—they will welcome such a move. No one here ever refuses a scholarship, and the most convinced anti-American African will willingly study at Cornell.

This will not destroy their personalities. Life, like art, is based on the experience of others, and there can be no rich society or culture if it lives on itself, without influences. The African nations will not speak the same French and English we speak; they will not make the same films, or write the same books, or produce the same styles of architecture. They do not have to have television, or twin beds, or stamp collections. But at least we could—and should—give them something with which to make their originality a positive and creative thing, not a reason for a great angry feeling of isolatedness in a galloping world which has left them behind in every field. Those of us who love Africa must love it, as we love individuals, for what it is, and not for the illusion that it seeks to present to itself and to the outside world.

An Hour with Walter Lippmann

Recently Walter Lippmann, America's most distinguished analyst of public affairs, was interviewed for an hour on television by Howard K. Smith of the Columbia Broadcasting System. The interview was based in considerable measure on first-hand information Lippmann had obtained in earlier private conversations with Premier Khrushchev, President de Gaulle, Prime Minister Macmillan, and President Kennedy. Despite the overriding public significance of the hour-long interview, 135 of the 250 affiliated stations of CBS declined to carry the Lippmann interview, preferring to substitute the convential fare of television. The Progressive *is delighted to be able to present, in only slightly abbreviated form, the interview suppressed by so many stations.*—The Editors.

Smith: In a column about a year ago, you said, in regard to the qualities a good President should have, the first thing is his ability to see through to what is permanent and enduring. This second sight is the quality of great leaders. Do you think that Kennedy has that second sight?

Lippmann: I think he is capable of having it. But I think it is too early to say that he has or hasn't got it.

Smith: Well, what has President Kennedy demonstrated so far?

Lippmann: What he has done in the four or five months is, first, to carry on in all its essentials the Eisenhower economic philosophy and the Eisenhower international commitments, while never explaining to the country that those can be changed. It's like the Eisenhower Administration thirty years younger. Well, that's the way he started, but that isn't the way he's going to go. Now, I think that in the next year, he will make the great decision, whether he can afford to balance the budget in the Eisenhower sense and allow the economy to remain at a fairly quiet level; or whether he wants to give it a real push upward. That's going to be decided in the coming months. And a weakness of Kennedy is that he never explained these things to the American people.

Smith: Now, Mr. Nixon has said that; Senator Fulbright has said that, and you have said that. Yet [Kennedy has] spoken more than Mr. Eisenhower did.

Lippmann: I know, but he hasn't explained. He has not explained what his economic challenge is, and what it is going to require in the way of much stronger measures. He never explained why, if he wants to do all these things such as fight the cold war and win it—really outdo the Communists—it's got to be done at full blast of the American economy, with a production of fifty billions more than we produced this year. He needs money to do that. That's never been explained to our people, so they have no sense of urgency. And he has never explained to them the very unpleasant fact which he didn't create—it's not his fault—that we have moral commitments and legal commitments, mainly around the rim of Asia, which were built up before he took office and when we were the supreme military power in the world. And coming down from being supreme to being only equal is an awful wrench for every country, and it makes people frustrated and angry.

Smith: Well, can you understand why he has not communicated?

Lippmann: I put it to this: that he is a very quick and intelligent man, himself—reads very fast, understands very fast, and it bores him to explain things. He likes to make decisions and announce them, but he doesn't explain them.

Smith: Is it possible that a free, loose-jointed, easy-going society like the American democracy can compete with a tightly concentrated, tightly controlled, secret dictatorship like that of the Soviet Union and Red China?

Lippmann: Well, that's the dream of our age. That's the question, and that is why many of us think that the Kennedy Administration has to get going and moving rapidly, or we won't be able to do it. I wouldn't like, for a moment, to underestimate how formidable this competition is and this threat. What we're going to have to do is going to take a lot of money, and it's going to take a very strong government.

Smith: Well, if Mr. Kennedy set himself one main goal in the election campaign, it was to resurrect America's fallen prestige. Do you think that in his legislative program he is doing the right things necessary to that end?

Lippmann: I don't believe he's really got started doing that, because he is

not sure of himself, because he is conscious that he doesn't have a really effective working majority in Congress for important measures, and because, I take it, he judges that the mood of the country is not in favor of doing the things which would really create a new sense of prestige; because in the last analysis, American prestige depends not on arms, although we must have arms. It depends on the example we set to the world, and if we set the example of a very brilliant active economy and society, in which we were dealing with all our problems actively, our prestige would rise in the world.

SMITH: Now, judging from the mood on Capitol Hill, this is not a good year for foreign aid. Is there a good case in favor of foreign aid that isn't being made?

LIPPMANN: I would say that the United States can no more refuse to contribute to foreign aid in the world than the richest man in town can refuse to contribute to the community chest. You just can't live in the world community—we couldn't live—refusing to aid anybody. Now, the nature of the method of aiding is very debatable. And I hope and believe that there is a movement on foot to reform some of its worst abuses. It is true, as some of the liberal critics in the Congress have been saying, that a lot of this money, as in Laos, simply enriched the upper class who exploited and flaunted their riches all over, and increased the hatred of the poor for the rich. And that made very fertile ground for Communist propaganda. In other places, we've undoubtedly spent much too much money on armies that have no military value whatsoever from the point of view of our interests, but are kept there, are paid for by us, in order to keep them loyal to the king or ruler of the country so they won't overthrow us. Those are great abuses. On the other hand, if the world isn't going to go into that landslide into Communism which Khrushchev predicts, there have to be anchor points in all the continents which show that prosperity and a certain amount of social justice can be achieved by another way than the Communist way. And that means that you must focus your energy, your aid, on key countries. The key country in Asia is India. If India can be made to work as a successful, democratic state, the influence of that will spread all over Southeast Asia, no matter who takes over in Laos in the next few months. The key country in Latin America is not Cuba. It's Brazil. I would hesitate to say just which is the key country in Africa, but I imagine it might be Nigeria. And I think in those cases, we ought to focus our aid, not necessarily stopping this other aid, which is really a form of bribery to keep them quiet, but focus it and do enough to do it. There's no use building half a bridge across a river—you've got to build a whole bridge.

SMITH: Some people say our salvation is not in what we do, but what happens to the Communists. Now, Charles Bohlen, who's probably our outstanding Soviet expert in the State Department, made a speech a short while ago, in which he said that if we can just hold things for another ten years, Russian Communism may lose its aggressive revolutionary momentum the way Islam did in the Middle Ages, and we may be able, then, to get along with it. Do you find any consolation in that thought?

LIPPMANN: I would think it dangerous to find consolation in that thought. I hope that will be true, but that is a little bit like Khrushchev's inevitability doctrine in reverse, and I don't think things are inevitable. I think men have to act to make the inevitable happen.

Justus in The Minneapolis Star

Crucial Summit

SMITH: Now, the President, in his speech to the people afterwards, said that the most somber aspect of the talks [with Khrushchev] was the discussion about Germany and Berlin.

LIPPMANN: Oh, well, I think there's no doubt at all that the central problem is Germany and Berlin, and that all these other things they discussed—Laos and nuclear testing and disarmament, and the general movement of Communism in the uncommitted lands—are all related to this central issue, which is the focus of the cold war. That's the focal point where, if there's going to be a third World War, it will come. Khrushchev said, when I talked to him, "I would agree to a united Germany if it were Communist, but you won't agree to that—and I won't agree to a united Germany if it has to give up Communism and become like Adenauer's Germany. So there's no possibility of uniting them." In fact, on that, there is a curious agreement between Khrushchev and de Gaulle, for instance. Khrushchev and Macmillan. We have always adhered to the idea that Germany ought eventually to be reunited. But we don't press it because we know it's not practical. Now, at the same time, there are left in Berlin, in West Berlin, two and a half million Germans, who are not Communists at all; who are very anti-Communist; whose sympathies, whose ties, whose economic connections, whose culture, whose everything is with the West, and who are democratic people, and we have an absolutely unquestioned obligation of honor to see that they are not crushed, or not enslaved, or not starved out.

SMITH: Well, could you summarize on the basis of your conversation with Khrushchev what he wants and what he would be willing to negotiate about regarding Berlin?

LIPPMANN: All I can tell you is that Khrushchev says he wants to negotiate. When it came to negotiations he might stall, as we know from the experience with the nuclear test ban and everything else. But I would not pass up the chance to do that, if we can negotiate with the Soviet Union a new treaty which guarantees the future of Germany—of Berlin. He wants to give legal status to the East German state.

SMITH: If what Mr. Rusk mentioned takes place, that is, a crisis is provoked in the summer or fall, and the Russians hand over control of our communications with Berlin to the East German puppets, what would you be in favor of doing?

LIPPMANN: As I understand Khrushchev, a separate peace treaty is a last resort. He doesn't want to do it. He said that half a dozen times: "I don't want the tension. I know it'll create tension. I want to avoid it. But in the last run, I've got to do it." And I'll tell you, if you like, later, why he thinks he's got to do it.

SMITH: Could you tell me now?

LIPPMANN: Yes. I asked him, "Why are you in such a hurry?" And he said, "I'm in a hurry because I want the frontiers of Germany, and the status of Berlin, and the demarcation line between the two German states settled in a treaty before"—and then he said—"before Hitler's generals in West Germany get the atomic bomb." And he said. "They're going to get it. They're already being trained how to use it. They haven't got the warheads, but they're going to get them, and they surely will get them in four or five years. And they'll get it from you, or they'll get it from the French, who'll be able to make them by that time. And if that comes, then the great danger for Europe exists, because either by their attacking East Germany and overruning East Berlin—or the other way around, that the East Germans rise and they go to their defense—either way, there'll be nothing to stop it. Nobody will have any agreements. You won't intervene—and there we'll be with a very dangerous war on our hands. So, we must have a treaty first. And that is what I'm pressing for. But I want to get those frontiers fixed so that if either Germany moves, in a military sense, in the next four or five years, *it* will be the aggressor." Now, that's his argument and that's why he's in a hurry.

SMITH: Well, what's the next step? What do we do now?

LIPPMANN: I think the next step is one which involves a change in our basic approach to the German problem. We have taken the line, conventionally, that everything in Berlin is as good as it could be from our point of view; that any change in the situation of Berlin would be for the worse. Therefore, we must stand firm and stand pat. That's Dr. Adenauer's view. Change nothing; fight, threaten to fight, if anything is changed. Don't negotiate. It can't be negotiated. Now, the other view, which is the one I share, is that the situation in Berlin is not good, that Berlin is in a state of chronic crisis. I think our position should be not that any change in the guarantees of the rights of the people of Berlin is a defeat and a surrender, but that those guarantees should be improved, if it's possible to improve them. I would like to see the position of saying to Khrushchev, we don't like Berlin the way it is. We want to improve it, and if you can negotiate with us an improvement, we'll be very interested.

SMITH: Well, people who say that you can't reach an agreement with the Russians generally cite the fate of the nuclear test ban talks in Geneva. The President sounded very pessimistic about that. Khrushchev doesn't seem, now, to want any agreement on it. How do you explain that?

LIPPMANN: We talked quite a lot about the nuclear test, and my explanation will have to be my guess, but the fact is that he's clearly not terribly interested in it. Now, there are several possible explanations, and they may, all of them, be true. One is, part of the agreement would have to be that China would be included and he may not be able to deliver China. I'm inclined to think that has a good deal to do with it, because he talks about our not being able to deliver France. But I think that's his way of saying that he can't deliver China, because when he talked about France to me, he said, "Well, what's the good of an agreement? If France doesn't sign it she'll test for you. You'll just ask her to go and test them in the Sahara Desert." And I said, "And China will test for you." And he sort of looked slightly amused, because he likes to be challenged sometimes, and he said, "That's a fair question, but China isn't able to test yet." He thinks the weapons he has are really good enough. And while we seem to be very interested in developing bigger weapons that weigh less, he has these enormous rockets.

SMITH: I'd like to talk to you now about the latest Russian diplomatic creation, and that is what Mr. Mikoyan called the "Troika" system of control. Well, that is that almost everything, nuclear test bans and the United Nations and everything else be controlled by three people. One, a westerner, one a Communist, and one a neutral, and each of those has a veto. Now, if that is applied, wouldn't that stagnate all international activity?

LIPPMANN: Yes. It's a fairly recent dogma. Troika, you know, comes from a Russian thing where three horses pull a cart or a sleigh. If one horse sits down then the two can't move. I didn't speak to Mr. Khrushchev about this particular point, but I did to a very close adviser of his, a Soviet official. I said, "Why three?" He said, "Well, we really mean two." He said, "We really mean that everything must be done by agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R. We brought in the third because they're there. They have no power, of course, but they're there and it looks better to include them."

SMITH: Well, does this not threaten the entire future of the United Nations?

LIPPMANN: Yes. The future of the United Nations is very much threatened by the fact that although Mr. Hammarskjold has another two years, I think, he couldn't be re-elected at present, and nobody else like him could be elected, and there's quite a good chance that if there is no understanding reached with the Russians

MOVING?

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on this point, which is—I wouldn't regard it as inflexible; it's negotiable, but I don't know how negotiable—there just won't be a Secretary General, and if there's no Secretary General, the U.N. will be reduced to a debating society, or the Security Council will meet, but it won't be able to order anything.

SMITH: Now, the most mysterious of all the events that have happened is the Cuban debacle.

LIPPMANN: I think the answer you come to is, that the advice to go ahead, the green light for doing it, or the energy demanding that we go ahead, all came from senior advisers. The junior advisers, the men who've come to Washington with Kennedy, were not strong enough, perhaps not wise enough, all of them, although some may have been, to tell the President to overrule people with such eminence as the people who advised him to do it. I think, there, he didn't feel that he knew enough to overrule the CIA, the Chiefs of Staff, what there was of the State Department, and so on. Cuba was a wrong and a foolish thing to do. It was wrong in itself. It was foolishly handled.

SMITH: Well, now, what should we do about Cuba and Castro?

LIPPMANN: The thing that put Castro overall in right perspective was a thing that Senator Fulbright said in the private discussions beforehand, which is that Castro is a thorn in our flesh but he's not a dagger in our hearts. The question is, is Cuba a military threat to the United States in view of the fact that it is so closely connected with the Soviet Union? I would call the establishment of a missile base or a submarine base, in Cuba, as marking a threat. I think we must keep the thing under really close watch, and it's perfectly easy to do. It's only fair to say that up to this point, there is no evidence of any Soviet military base in Cuba. Allen Dulles told me himself, not long ago, that in the invasion there were no Russian planes; that those planes that Castro used were old American planes. There is not a sign of a missile base, and of course, it stands to reason if they can shoot missiles from Siberia to the moon, why should they come ninety miles away? Anyway, we'd match that. The next danger of Castro is that, through his embassies in Latin America, there is a funnel through which propaganda agents—propaganda and agents and money gotten from the Soviet Union, or China, or somewhere—can be pushed into these various countries of South America, and the subversive propaganda supported. That is a problem about which we can't do anything. We can't break up the relations between, let's say, Brazil and Cuba. That's up to Brazil. But there's nothing to prevent us from watching it. But the biggest danger of Castro—much the biggest—is that he might succeed in Cuba in solving problems which have not yet been solved in a great many Latin American countries. That's where we have to compete with him. If he can succeed there and our friends and other Latin Americans fail, then his example is far more dangerous than anything he himself can do.

SMITH: Do you think we're on the right path towards meeting that threat?

LIPPMANN: I think we are. I think that President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, as he calls it, a rather fancy name for helping, is basically right.

SMITH: Just after the Cuban debacle, you said that the Joint Chiefs and the head of the CIA had to go. Do you still feel that way?

LIPPMANN: I do. I think it's going to be done too—I hope with as little bloodshed as possible, but I think the CIA, itself, may disappear and be dissolved into its parts taken over in different directions.

SMITH: Well, in all these setbacks in which the CIA has been involved, the President, in a speech, has implied, and many of his aides have said quite frankly to us reporters, in private, that they consider the press to be a limitation on our effectiveness in carrying out policy—a free press unrestrained. What do you think about that? Do you agree with that?

LIPPMANN: They're very confused about all that. I think there are some things the press might do better or differently or not at all than it does. But what they were complaining about was something there's no criticism being made of, namely that [news of] the Cuban expedition was published to the world before it happened. I consider it the duty of the press to expose that kind of thing to the light of day, because I don't think a democracy like this should have secret training camps and secret armies and secret navies in foreign countries—all in violation of its treaties and its own laws.

SMITH: The Communist nations appear to be winning the competition we call the cold war. How do you explain that?

LIPPMANN: I think that's an exaggeration, really, and somewhat of an optical illusion. They are winning it in the most backward and reactionary places, but I don't consider that they're winning it in Europe. In spite of Castro, I don't believe they're going to win it in Brazil, which is going to determine more than anything else what happens in South America. They haven't won it in Mexico. They haven't won it in Japan. The fact that the Japanese don't love Americans doesn't mean that they're Communists.

SMITH: Well, the one question on which Khrushchev and the President seemed less pessimistic than on other questions was on Laos. Yet, recent events don't seem to have borne out that relative optimism. What do you think about that?

LIPPMANN: I think the answer is that Laos is not a primary vital interest to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev regards it as quite secondary, and it's not a primary interest to the United States either. It's a country which is remote, very difficult to get at, very unsuited to American type of military power. There are no roads in it, no ports, no airfields, and I think that it's a wise thing for a country to measure—to tailor—its policy to its military powers.

SMITH: Well, do you believe in what's called the domino theory, and that is that if we lose Laos, then we'll lose Thailand, and so on, until we've lost all Southeast Asia because of this one country?

LIPPMANN: I remember the domino theory first was brought up in the

Middle East, and I remember when people said Nasser made a deal with the Soviets about arms, and they said, "Ah, Egypt's gone"—then Syria was gone, and then Iraq. None of them is gone, and I don't consider Laos gone. Laos is not going to be what we rather foolishly, I think, two or three years ago, tried to make it—an American satellite, whatever you like to call it. I mean, putting in a government that suited us—and that is not possible.

SMITH: Well, Mr. Lippmann, you have been opposed to taking action, military, forceful action in Laos, or unilateral action in Cuba. You have said you're in favor of negotiations over Berlin, which may involve making concessions to the Russians over Berlin. What would be your answer to those who would say that this is a policy of appeasement?

LIPPMANN: My answer to that would be that you can't decide these questions of life and death for the world by epithets like appeasement. Furthermore, I think the reasons for doing what I advocate are based on the soundest, strategical principle, and is this: The Soviet Union is not engaged in any of these places. It hasn't sent its troops anywhere. As long as it isn't engaged, we mustn't be engaged. If we get ourselves involved in a Korean war in Indo-China, and all our reserves begin flowing that way, or get ourselves involved in a thing we can't finish in Cuba, because the guerrilla war may go on forever, then we will weaken ourselves for what is really the issue, which is to keep the balance of power between ourselves and the Soviet Union intact. I don't agree with the people who think that we have to go out and shed a little blood to prove we're virile men. This is too serious a business for that kind of thinking, and in regard to Cuba, my feeling was not only that it was illegal for us to do it, and we cannot go into the business of violating treaties. We're not that kind of country. And then behind that lies a very personal and human feeling—that I don't think old men ought to promote wars for young men to fight. I don't like warlike old men. I think it's their business to try as best they can, by whatever wisdom they can find, to avert what would be an absolutely irreparable calamity for the world.

The Medical Care Dollar

by SELIG GREENBERG

SHOULD DOCTORS be the sole judges of the fairness of the fees they charge for their services to patients covered by health insurance? Or should such fees, involving as they do a commodity that can clearly be classified as a vital public utility, be subject to some public regulations?

Even to pose these touchy questions is bound to raise the blood pressure of the medical profession, whose members have long considered the right to charge what they please as one of their most cherished prerogatives. But the issue is beginning to come to the fore in the mounting debate over present health insurance patterns and operations, and it has recently been raised with characteristic vigor by a state official whose concern for keeping down the costs of medical care is attracting national attention. The official is Francis R. Smith, Pennsylvania's outspoken state insurance commissioner, who set the pace for his counterparts in a number of other states three years ago by cracking down on Blue Cross and the voluntary hospitals and ordering them to curb abuses and to institute a number of economy measures. He has now caught up with Blue Shield, the surgical-medical insurance program controlled by the medical societies, and in doing so he has inevitably run head on into the question of the propriety of letting the doctors themselves decide what they should charge.

In a far-reaching decision which appears to leave the door wide open for state-imposed controls on physicians' incomes, Smith has not only turned down a Blue Shield request for increases in its fee schedule but has strongly indicated his conviction that many of the program's subscribers are now being charged too much and that fees should be reduced rather than raised. The commissioner directed the insurance plan to make a comprehensive review of its entire fee schedule and to "consider the feasibility of extending full-service benefits to greater numbers of our citizens."

Smith recalled in his ruling that Blue Shield was set up by act of the state legislature primarily to provide people in the lower income brackets with medical services "at costs which they could reasonably afford" by contracting with physicians to furnish such services "for reasonable fees which doctors were certain to receive." The underlying principle of the insurance mechanism, he emphasized, is not only that the risk of medical costs is spread over a large number of people but that the doctors can afford to give their services "at lower than normal charges" because they are "sure of receiving their fees."

Here the commissioner put his finger on one of the basic facts about voluntary health insurance—that unless it is rigidly controlled, it can become little more than a collection agency for the doctors. A crucial point to bear in mind is that although the

SELIG GREENBERG, writer on medical problems for the Providence Journal and the Evening Bulletin, has twice been honored by the Lasker Foundation for his distinguished writing on medicine. He won the Associated Press Managing Editors Association award for his series of articles on the problems of the aged.

medical profession has had to be pushed into participation in health insurance and continues to resist its expansion, the insurance set up has actually improved and stabilized the income of physicians by guaranteeing them fees they might otherwise not have been able to collect at all from low-income patients. To a large extent, health insurance has eliminated charity services, traditionally used by the profession to justify its charges to patients in the higher income level. But this has nowhere near enough been counterbalanced by low charges to a substantial segment of patients.

Pennsylvania's Blue Shield drew Commissioner Smith's latest thunderbolt upon itself by applying for approval of a premium rate increase of 26.1 per cent and of a special surgical-medical insurance program for persons over the age of sixty-five.

One of the largest insurance plans in the country, the Pennsylvania Blue Shield has more than 4,200,000 subscribers and about 13,000 participating doctors. To these physicians and a number of osteopaths and dental surgeons it paid out last year nearly $60,000,000 for services to subscribers. The insurance program had not received a rate increase for about sixteen years, and it was plainly entitled to some relief in view of the rising utilization of services which had been forcing it for some time to dip into its reserves. But what aroused Mr. Smith's ire was the proposal for raising a number of the fees which constitute full payment for services rendered to subscribers within fixed income limits. According to Blue Shield's own estimates, the higher fees sought would have cost the insurance plan an additional $1,262,600 a year.

Delivering a stern lecture on the medical profession's responsibilities and the state's broad authority in the matter, the commissioner granted a premium rate increase of only 21.3 per cent and said he would "defer action" on the requested fee revisions pending the submission of "additional substantiating data." He left little doubt, however, that it would take quite a lot of "substantiating data" to convince him that the doctors are entitled to higher fees. In fact, he took the position that the existing Blue Shield fee schedule is probably ample to justify full-service coverage, without extra charges, for subscribers above the present income limits and that it may be possible to reduce both the fees and the premium rates for the lower-income groups.

The Pennsylvania Blue Shield has two plans. Plan A provides for full-service benefits for individuals earning less than $2,500 a year and families with earnings of less than $4,000 a year. Plan B guarantees full coverage for persons earning up to $4,000 a year and families with incomes of up to $6,000. In return for the broader coverage of Plan B, its premium rates are higher than those of Plan A. So are many of the Plan B fees, to compensate physicians for foregoing the right to charge extra for their services to an additional group of subscribers.

Smith noted that the present fee schedules "cover substantially more than eighty-two per cent of doctors' normal charges," even though they are allowed to levy supplementary fees on those patients earning more than $6,000 a year. In view of this, he said, Blue Shield should "determine whether the income limits under both Plan A and Plan B could be raised without any further adjustment of fee schedules."

"Conversely," he added, "I direct that consideration be given to determine whether a totally revised fee schedule with generally lower fees reflected in lower subscription rates for full-service benefits can be developed for all citizens of Pennsylvania without regard to their age . . . Society's general acceptance of the doctor's privilege to charge high-income patients larger fees for a specific service is based upon society's expectation that doctors will charge low-income patients a much lesser fee for the same service. The insurance commissioner, who represents the public, can properly inquire and, in fact, is obligated to inquire under the law, whether the Blue Shield rates paid by our low-income citizens are providing doctors with fees which only persons with substantial incomes would normally be charged."

Rejected "summarily" by Smith was a Blue Shield contention that when its fee schedule committee has recommended adoption of a fee and this has been approved by its board of directors, "such fee is entitled to be regarded as appropriate in the absence of medical testimony to the contrary."

"Blue Shield's position, if true," said Smith, "would for all practical purposes deny me, as insurance commissioner, the express authority placed in me by the Blue Shield Regulatory Act to approve all methods and rates of payments by Blue Shield to doctors serving its subscribers. If Blue Shield is correct, I could never reject any proposed fee until I, as insurance commissioner, had elicited and obtained medical testimony challenging its reasonableness. Furthermore, I would doubt the readiness of many doctors to testify against the reasonableness of fees worked out by Blue Shield and committees of the State Medical Society. If, as Blue Shield contends, a proposed fee must be accepted when not contradicted by medical testimony, it would not be the insurance commissioner who would be empowered to approve or reject proposed fees, but rather, it would be the medical profession."

The proposed "senior citizens" insurance program was rejected by Commissioner Smith on the ground that it failed to take into consideration the generally lower income level of the aged group and to provide it with lower premium rates through an agreement by participating doctors to charge less for older subscribers. His comments in disapproving this plan are of particular interest in view of the vehement opposition of organized medicine to President Kennedy's proposal for a government-operated health insurance program for the aged tied to the social security system.

Spokesmen for the doctors have contended that the job of providing medical services for the aged is fully feasible under voluntary auspices and that the medical profession itself can be depended upon to help older people get the care they need at a cost they can afford. But according

to the facts brought out at the Pennsylvania hearings, the State Medical Society rejected suggestions by the insurance organization that doctors agree to accept lower fees "which would have been reflected in premium reductions for older subscribers." It is reported to have insisted instead that persons over sixty-five be required to pay the standard non-group premium rates, which are considerably higher than those for group enrollment. Blue Shield officials admitted, Smith said, that the Pennsylvania Medical Society "told us what we should do" with regard to the fee schedule for the aged program and conceded that "persons or groups representing older people and other segments of the public were not consulted at all in the formulation of any aspect of the senior citizens' program."

In hitting out at the "subordination of initiative and policy" of the insurance plan to the wishes of the State Medical Society, the commissioner acknowledged that the enabling act establishing Blue Shield requires that the majority of the members of its board of directors be medical doctors. "This fact alone, however," he said, "neither justifies nor contemplates that Blue Shield policy and operations be subordinated to the policies and programs of the State Medical Society. It certainly does not justify or contemplate that policy decisions will be made for Blue Shield by the Medical Society and summarily passed on to the Blue Shield for implementation.

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Expressing concern over the fact that eighteen of the twenty-three members of the Blue Shield board of directors are doctors, Smith said he strongly felt that "there is room for more public representation" on the board. He suggested that the board either be enlarged voluntarily or that the law be amended to assure broader public participation.

To enforce his views, the commissioner directed Blue Shield to cooperate with Blue Cross and the state and county medical societies in devising steps to curb "unnecessary utilization of hospital and medical services" and control other abuses which now needlessly raise the cost of health care. He specifically ordered the insurance organization to set up a utilization division and to collaborate with medical societies and hospital medical staffs in the establishment of admissions committees in all Pennsylvania hospitals to check on unnecessary or excessively long hospitalization. Blue Shield was directed to "submit until further notice to the insurance department quarterly reports, in written form, summarizing its activities under these directives."

"There is ample latitude," Smith said, "for Blue Shield to do much more than it has in cooperating with Blue Cross plans, medical societies, hospitals, and the public in lessening unnecessary utilization of Blue Shield services. With the exception of diagnostic and emergency services provided in doctors' offices, practically all Blue Shield services are rendered in hospitals. If unnecessary hospital utilization is reduced, it should follow that a substantial amount of Blue Shield services would also be reduced."

Blue Shield plans "face the greatest challenge in their history," the commissioner warned. "That challenge is to provide ever-broadening medical care to citizens at costs which they can afford. If free voluntary effort through public-purpose organizations cannot meet this challenge, the future of free medicine in America is in danger . . . Blue Shield must identify itself clearly and distinctly in the public mind as the agency empowered and directed by the legislature to bring adequate health services to our people at prices they can meet within their budgets."

It is not without irony that while the medical profession has been fighting a last-ditch battle against Federal government encroachment on its business, the regulatory power of the states has been making itself increasingly felt through the back door of voluntary health insurance.

As the costs of medical care continue to skyrocket and force Blue Cross and Blue Shield to seek repeated premium rate increases, the ingredients that make up these costs are increasingly coming under critical public scrutiny.

There is a growing realization that the insurance framework is not merely a provision for spreading the costs of health care services but has other far-reaching effects whose overall result is a steady pyramiding of these costs. Involved in the picture is much more than the increased utilization of health services with the lessening of the economic barrier to needed care. What must be corrected are the built-in imbalances in the existing pattern of voluntary health insurance that promote faulty utilization of medical services, excessive use of costly hospital facilities, and other abuses which needlessly inflate the bill. Already being subjected to close examination are the manner in which our hospitals are functioning and the diverse opportunities for greater economy in their operation. Other elements in the medical care dollar, notably the sizable share going for physicians' services, are now starting to come in for similar attention in what promises to develop into a stormy reappraisal of the medical profession's privileges and responsibilities.

'The Last Best Hope'

by HUGO L. BLACK

The continued whittling away of basic American liberties by the United States Supreme Court has no more articulate and courageous opponent than Mr. Justice Hugo L. Black. Typical of the magnificent if losing battles he has been waging was his dissenting opinion in the recent case, Communist Party of the United States of America v. Subversive Activities Control Board. The Progressive *is happy to present a condensed version of Justice Black's memorable decision which received so little attention in the nation's press.*—THE EDITORS.

I DO NOT BELIEVE that it can be too often repeated that the freedoms of speech, press, petition, and assembly guaranteed by the First Amendment must be accorded to the ideas we hate or sooner or later they will be denied to the ideas we cherish. The first banning of an association because it advocates hated ideas—whether that association be called a political party or not—marks a fateful moment in the history of a free country. That moment seems to have arrived for this country.

The Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 here involved defines "Communist action" organizations and requires them to register with the Attorney General giving much information of every kind with regard to their property, income, activities, and members. The Communist Party has been ordered to register under that Act by the Subversive Activities Control Board and has challenged the validity of that order on the ground, among others, that the Act is unconstitutional in that it amounts to a complete outlawry of the Communist Party. The contention is that this Act, considered as a whole and in its relation to existing laws which affect members of the Party, imposes such overhanging threats of disgrace, humiliation, fines, forfeitures, and lengthy imprisonments upon registered organizations and their members, most of which burdens become effective automatically upon registration, that it will be impossible for the Party to continue to function if the registration order is upheld.

The Court's [majority] opinion is devoted chiefly to the task of explaining why it will not decide any of the substantial issues raised by this attack upon the constitutionality of the Act as it is actually written and will actually operate and why it must decide the case just as though none of these other burdens existed and we were dealing with an Act that required nothing more than the registration of an organization.

I cannot agree to decide the case on any such hypothetical basis. If registration were the only issue in the case, I would agree at once that Congress has power to require every "person" acting as an agent of a foreign principal to file registration statements comprehensively showing his agency activities as is required, for example, by the Foreign Agents Registration Act. That Act requires the registration of any "person"—including an individual, partnership, association, corporation, organization, or other combination of individuals—"who acts or agrees to act, within the United States, as . . . a public-relations counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee, servant, agent, representative, or attorney for a foreign principal. . . ." Referring to that Act, I said in *Viereck v. United States:*

> "Resting on the fundamental constitutional principle that our people, adequately informed, may be trusted to distinguish between the true and the false, the bill is intended to label information of foreign origin so that hearers and readers may not be deceived by the belief that the information comes from a disinterested source. Such legislation implements rather than detracts from the prized freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment."

The Act before us now, however, unlike the Foreign Agents Registration Act involved in the *Viereck* case, is not based on the principle that "our people, adequately informed, may be trusted to distinguish between the true and the false." Instead, the present Act, like many other pieces of current legislation, is based on the precisely contrary principle that "our people [even when] adequately informed may [not] be trusted to distinguish between the true and the false."

The difference between the Subversive Activities Control Act and the Foreign Agents Registration Act is strikingly illustrated by the reasons Congress has itself given for the enactment of the statute now before us. When Viereck registered under the earlier and genuine registration statute, he was not thereby branded as being engaged in an evil, despicable undertaking bent on destroying this nation. But that is precisely the effect of the present Act. Registration as a "Communist action organization" under the Subversive Activities Control Act means, according to the express provisions of the Act, that the Party and its members who register are under the control of a

foreign dictatorship, that they devised "clever and ruthless espionage and sabotage tactics," and that they are a part of a "world-wide revolutionary movement whose purpose it is, by treachery, deceit, infiltration . . . terrorism and any other means deemed necessary to establish a Communist totalitarian dictatorship in the countries throughout the world." A registrant organization is declared, by a finding of Congress, to be "an organization numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined," merely awaiting a chance to overthrow this government by force. And the members of such an organization are declared by the Act to have "repudiated their allegiance to the United States, and in effect transferred their allegiance to the foreign country in which is vested the direction and control of the world Communist movement."

This difference standing alone would be sufficient to establish the essential dissimilarity of the Subversive Activities Control Act from genuine registration statutes such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act. For the need of government to provide means by which the people can obtain useful information— the basis of every genuine registration statute —can certainly be accomplished without resort to official legislative pronouncements as to the treasonable nature of those compelled to register. But this difference does not stand alone in the case of the Subversive Activities Control Act—indeed, there are so many other differences of so much greater magnitude that the recitals of the Act branding those who register under it pale almost into insignificance.

The plan of the Act is to make it impossible for an organization to continue to function once a registration order is issued against it. To this end, the Act first provides crushing penalties to insure complete compliance with the disclosure requirements of registration. Thus, if the Party or its members fail to register within the time required by the Act, or if they fail to make annual reports as required, or to keep records as required, each individual guilty of such failure can be punished by a fine of $10,000, by imprisonment for five years, or both, for each offense—and each offense means "each day of failure to register" or "each listing of the name or address of any one individual" either by the organization or by an individual. Thus, for a delay of thirty days in filing required reports, a fine of $300,000 and imprisonment for 150 years could be imposed by a trial judge.

Having thus made it mandatory that Communist organizations and individual Communists make a full disclosure of their identities and activities, the Act then proceeds to heap burden after burden upon those so exposed. Certain tax deductions allowed to others are denied to a registered organization. Mail matter must be stamped before the organization sends it out to show that it was disseminated by a "Communist action" organization, with all the treasonable connotations given that term by the recitals of "fact" in the Act. Members of a registered organization cannot hold certain jobs with the government, or any jobs with private businesses engaged in doing certain work for the government. Members cannot use or attempt to use a passport and cannot even make application for a passport without being subject to a penalty of five years in the penitentiary. The Act thus makes it extremely difficult for a member of the Communist Party to live in this country and, at the same time, makes it a crime for him to try to get a passport to get out.

In addition to these burdens imposed directly by the Act itself, the registration requirement must also be considered in the context of the other laws now existing which affect the Communist Party. The Act requires that the information obtained upon registration be given wide publicity, thus insuring that those identified as members of the Party will be subjected to all the civil disabilities, criminal prosecutions, and public harassments that have become common in recent years. I agree with Mr. Justice Douglas that this aspect of the Act is alone sufficient to establish its invalidity under the self-incrimination provision of the Fifth Amendment. But I think the interrelationship between the present Act and these other laws goes deeper than that, for I think that interrelationship establishes all but conclusively that the present Act cannot be upheld as a mere registration statute. The information elicited by the Act must be considered, not, as in the *Viereck* case, an aid to the exercise of individual judgment by the people, but rather a part of a pattern of suppression by the government, for that is certainly the inevitable effect of any system that requires registration on the one hand and imposes pains and penalties upon those registering on the other.

In the context of this case, I can find no justification for the Court's refusal to pass upon the serious constitutional questions raised. The Court of Appeals met its responsibility by deciding the questions. The government has not asked that the Court refrain from giving a full decision on these important matters. Assuming that the Act is wholly valid aside from registration and that Congress does have power to outlaw groups advocating dangerous ideas, it seems to me unfair to Congress for this Court to refuse to decide whether its Act can be fully enforced. And assuming that the Act is not wholly valid because of some limitation upon that power, it seems to me that we should say so now. By refusing to do so, the Court in effect allows this serious question to be decided by default. For the Party can no more continue to function with all of these tremendous burdens of undetermined constitutional validity overhanging it and its members than it could if the burdens were considered and upheld. The only sense in which the Court has avoided a constitutional issue is by permitting the destruction of a group seeking to raise the

THE HIGH COST OF DYING

by RUTH MULVEY HARMER

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Madison, Wisconsin

issue of the constitutionality of its destruction.

This whole Act, with its pains and penalties, embarks this country, for the first time, on the dangerous adventure of outlawing groups that preach doctrines nearly all Americans detest. When the practice of outlawing parties and various public groups begins, no one can say where it will end. In most countries such a practice once begun ends with a one-party government. There is something of tragic irony in the fact that this Act, expressly designed to protect this nation from becoming a "totalitarian dictatorship" with "a single political party," has adopted to achieve its laudable purpose the policy of outlawing a party—a policy indispensable to totalitarian dictatorships. I think we should meet and decide this whole question now in the administration of a sound judicial policy that carries out our responsibilities both to Congress and to the American people.

In my judgment, the Act here under consideration is unconstitutional on at least three grounds in addition to its direct conflict with the self-incrimination provisions of the Fifth Amendment.

It is, in the first instance, a classical bill of attainder which our Constitution in two places prohibits, for it is a legislative act that inflicts pains, penalties, and punishments in a number of ways without a judicial trial. The legislative fact-findings as to Communist activities, which the Court—despite the constitutional command for trial of such facts by a court and jury—accepts as facts, supply practically all of the proof needed to bring the Communist Party within the proscriptions of the Act. The Act points unerringly to the members of that Party as guilty people who must be penalized as the Act provides. At the same time, these legislative fact-findings fall little short of being adequate in themselves to justify a finding of guilt against any persons who can be identified, however faintly, by any informer, as having been a member of the Communist Party.

Most of whatever is lacking in the legislative fact-findings is later supplied by administrative fact-findings of an agency which is not a court, which is not manned by independent

Justus in The Minneapolis Star

Dangerous Hunter

judges, and which does not have to observe the Constitutional right to trial by jury and other trial safeguards unequivocally commanded by the Bill of Rights. Yet, after this agency has made its findings and its conclusions, neither its findings of fact nor the findings of fact of the legislative body can subsequently be challenged in court by any individual who may later be brought up on a charge that he failed to register as required by the Act and the Board. The Act thus not only is a legislative bill of attainder but also violates due process by short-cutting practically all of the Bill of Rights, leaving no hope for anyone entangled in this legislative-administrative web except what has proved in this case to be one of the most truncated judicial reviews that the history of this Court can afford.

I think also that this outlawry of the Communist Party and imprisonment of its members violates the First Amendment. The question under that Amendment is whether Congress has power to outlaw an association, group or party either on the ground that it advocates a policy of violent overthrow of the existing government at some time in the distant future or on the ground that it is ideologically subservient to some foreign country. In my judgment, neither of these factors justifies an invasion of rights protected by the First Amendment.

Talk about the desirability of revolution has a long and honorable history, not only in other parts of the world, but in our own country. This kind of talk, like any other, can be used at the wrong time and for the wrong purpose. But, under our system of government, the remedy for this danger must be the same remedy that is applied to the danger that comes from any other erroneous talk—education and contrary argument. If that remedy is not sufficient, the only meaning of free speech must be that the revolutionary ideas will be allowed to prevail.

This conclusion is not affected by the fact that those advocating a policy of revolution are in sympathy with a foreign government. If there is one thing certain about the First Amendment it is that this Amendment was designed to guarantee the freest interchange of ideas about all public matters and that, of course, means the interchange of *all* ideas, however such ideas may be viewed in other countries and whatever change in the existing structure of government it may be hoped that these ideas will bring about. Now, when this country is trying to spread the high ideals of democracy all over the world—ideals that are revolutionary in many countries—seems to be a particularly inappropriate time to stifle First Amendment freedoms in this country. The same arguments that are used to justify the outlawry of Communist ideas here could be used to justify an outlawry of the ideas of democracy in other countries.

The freedom to advocate ideas about public matters through associations of the nature of political parties and societies was contemplated and protected by the First Amendment. The existence of such groups is now, and for centuries has been, a necessary part of any effective promulgation of beliefs about governmental policies. And the destruction of such groups is now and always has been one of the first steps totalitarian governments take. Within recent months we have learned of such practices in other countries. Only a few weeks ago an executive edict outlawing all parties, groups and associations all the way down through

Rotary Clubs was issued in a country where the government is largely in the hands of a single man. Indeed, our own ancestors were not unfamiliar with this practice. Men and women belonging to dissenting religious, political or social groups in England before the colonization of this country were sometmes imprisoned, mutilated, degraded by humiliating pillories, exiled and even killed for their views. . . .

At the very time England was going through its era of terror about the "Jacobins," a heated political struggle involving many of the same issues was going on in this country between the two chief political parties. One of those parties, the Federalists, wanted to outlaw the party of Jefferson on the ground that they too were "Jacobins" and therefore a threat to our security. The Jeffersonians quite naturally opposed such outlawry and in fact opposed any measure which would restrict the freedoms of speech, press, petition and assembly. The difference between the two parties was expressed by Jefferson in this way: "Both of our political parties, at least the honest part of them, agree conscientiously in the same object, the public good. . . . One fears most the ignorance of the people; the other, the selfishness of rulers independent of them. Which is right, time and experience will prove." This conflict of ideals and policies was temporarily resolved in favor of the Federalists and the result was the infamous era of the Alien and Sedition Acts. These laws, passed over vigorous Jeffersonian opposition, declared that it was necessary in order to protect the security of the nation to give the President the broadest of powers over aliens and to make substantial inroads upon the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly.

The enforcement of these statutes, particularly the Sedition Act, constitutes one of the greatest blots on our country's record of freedom. Publishers were sent to jail for writing their own views and for publishing the views of others. The slightest criticism of government or policies of government officials was enough to cause biased federal prosecutors to put the machinery of government to work to crush and imprison the critic. Rumors which filled the air pointed the finger of suspicion at good men and bad men alike, sometimes causing the social ostracism of people who loved their free country with a deathless devotion. Members of the Jeffersonian Party were picked out as special targets so that they could be illustrious examples of what could happen to people who failed to sing paeans of praise for current federal officials and their policies.

I regret, exceedingly regret, that I feel impelled to recount this history of the Federalist Sedition Act because, in all truth, it must be pointed out that this law—which has since been almost universally condemned as unconstitutional—did not go as far in suppressing the First Amendment freedoms of Americans as do the Smith Act and the Subversive Activities Control Act. All the fervor and all the eloquence and all the emotionalism and all the prejudice and all the parades of horrors about letting the people hear arguments for themselves were not sufficient in 1798 to persuade the members of Congress to pass a law which would directly and unequivocally outlaw the party of Jefferson, at which the law was undoubtedly aimed. The same arguments were made then about the "Jacobins," meaning the Jeffersonians, with regard to their alleged subservience to France, that are made today about the Communists with regard to their subservience to Russia . . .

These charges expressed fears that were echoed time and time again during the Congressional debate on the Alien and Sedition Acts. The very same fears are again being voiced today as a justification for curtailing the liberties of the people of America. Thus, the Subversive Activities Control Act under consideration says that "the Communist movement in the United States is an organization numbering thousands of adherents, rigidly and ruthlessly disciplined" only awaiting "a moment when . . . overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence may seem possible of achievement. . . ."

The truth is that this statutory outlawry of the Communist Party is not at all novel when considered in the perspective of history. Quite the contrary, it represents nothing more than the adoption by this country, in part at least, of one of the two conflicting views that have emerged from a long-standing and widespread dispute among political philosophers as to what kind of government will best serve the welfare of the people. That view is that governments should have almost unlimited powers. The other view is that governmental power should be very strictly limited. Both the Smith Act and the Subversive Activities Control Act are based upon the view that officials of the government should have power to suppress and crush by force critics and criticisms of governmental officials and their policies. The contrary view, which Congress necessarily rejected in passing these laws, is that current public officials should never be granted power to use governmental force to keep people from hearing, speaking, or publishing such criticisms of government or from assembling together to petition their government to make changes in governmental policies, however basic the majority may deem these policies to be.

It is my belief that our Constitution with its Bill of Rights was expressly intended to make our Government one of strictly limited powers. The Founders were intimately familiar with the restrictions upon liberty which inevitably flow from a government of unlimited powers. By and large, they had found this experience a painful one. Many of them were descended from families that had left England and had come to this country in order to escape laws that could send them to jail or penalize them in various ways for criticizing laws and policies which they thought bore too heavily and unfairly upon them. Others had personally felt the brunt of such repressive measures. Only after they won the Revolutionary War did these people have an opportunity to set up a government to their liking. To that end they finally settled upon the Constitution, which very clearly adopted the policy of limiting the powers of the Federal government. Even then the people of this country were not completely satisfied. They demanded more precise and unequivocal limitations upon the powers of government and obtained the Bill of Rights,

the central provisions of which were the First Amendment guarantees of complete religious and political freedom.

In the very face of the provisions of the First Amendment, however, the Court today upholds laws which ignore the wisdom of the Founders' decision to set up a limited government and adopt the policy of force to crush views about public matters entertained by a small minority in this country. This, to me, marks a major break in the wall designed by the First Amendment to keep this country free by leaving the people free to talk about any kind of change in basic governmental policies they desire to talk about. I see no possible way to escape the fateful consequences of a return to the era in which all governmental critics had to face the probability of being sent to jail except for this Court to abandon what I consider to be the dangerous constitutional doctrine of "balancing" to which the Court is at present adhering. That doctrine is not a new one. In fact, history shows that it has been the excuse for practically every repressive measure that Government has ever seen fit to adopt. Mr. Pitt proved, in 1799, that he was a master of the concept and language of "balancing" in his speech urging the passage of laws to muzzle the press of England in order to prevent the dissemination of the "revolutionary" ideas that England should have parliamentary reform:

> "We cannot too highly prize that sacred liberty [of the press] when we consider that it has been instrumental in bringing our Constitution to that envied perfection which it possesses. Yet it must also be admitted that when abused, the most fatal consequences have ever resulted from it. It has been the great principle of the Constitution that the liberty of the press should flourish, but it is also clear from the nature of the principle itself, and for the security of the press, that the author or publisher of every work should be amenable to the laws of his country."

And there certainly was no shortage of "balancers" in our own Congress when the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 were passed.

The "balancing test" of First Amendment freedoms is said to justify laws aimed at the advocacy of overthrow of the government "as speedily as circumstances would permit." Thus, the "test" being used here is identical to the arguments used to justify the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 in this country and the 1799 Sedition Act in England. The unprecedented incorporation into our constitutional law of this time-worn justification for tyranny has been used to break down even the minimal protections of the First Amendment forged by Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis which would bar prosecution for speech or writings in all cases except those in which the words used "so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country."

I realize that these laws are aimed only at the Communist Party. No one need console himself, however, that the policy of using governmental force to crush dissident groups upon which they are based can or will be stopped at that point. The weakening of constitutional safeguards in order to suppress one obnoxious group is a technique too easily available for the suppression of other obnoxious groups to expect its abandonment when the next generally hated group appears. Only eleven years ago, this Court upheld a governmental penalty directed at Communists on the ground that "only a relative handful" would be affected by the penalty involved in that case. Today, it upholds statutes which I think totally outlaw that Party, claiming nonetheless that "nothing which we decide here remotely carries . . . [the] implication . . . [that] Congress may impose similar requirements upon any group which pursues unpopular political objectives or which expresses an unpopular political ideology." I am very much afraid that we will see the day when the very implication which the Court now denies is found.

I am ready to admit that strong arguments can be made for saying that governments in general should have power to suppress speech and press. These arguments are particularly strong in countries where the existing government does not represent the will of the people because history shows that people have a way of not being willing to bear oppressive grievances without protest. Such protests, when bottomed upon facts, lead almost inevitably to an irresistible popular demand for either a redress of those grievances or a change in the government. It is plain that there are governments in the world today that desperately need to suppress such protests for they probably could not survive a week or even a day if they were deprived of the power to use their informers to intimidate, their jails to imprison, and their firing squads to shoot their critics. In countries of that kind, repressive measures like the Smith Act and the Subversive Activities Control Act are absolutely necessary to protect the ruling tyrants from the spread of information about their misdeeds. But in a democracy like ours, such laws are not only unnecessary but also constitute a baseless insult to the patriotism of our people.

I believe with the framers of the First Amendment that the internal security of a nation like ours does not and cannot be made to depend upon the use of force by government to make all the beliefs and opinions of the people fit into a common mold on any single subject. Such enforced conformity of thought would tend only to deprive our people of the bold spirit of adventure and progress which has brought this nation to its present greatness. The creation of public opinion by groups, organizations, societies, clubs, and parties, has been and is a necessary part of our democratic society. Such groups, like the Sons of Liberty and the American Corresponding Societies, played a large part in creating sentiment in this country that led the people of the Colonies to want a nation of their own. The father of the Constitution — James Madison — said, in speaking of the Sedition Act aimed at crushing the Jeffersonian Party, that had that law been in effect during the period before the Revolution, the United States might well have continued to be "miserable

colonies, groaning under a foreign yoke."

In my judgment, this country's internal security can better be served by depending upon the affection of the people than by attempting to instill them with fear and dread of the power of government. The Communist Party has never been more than a small group in this country. And its numbers had been dwindling even before the government began its campaign to destroy the Party by force of law. This was because a vast majority of the American people were against the Party's policies and overwhelmingly rejected its candidates year after year. That is the true American way of securing this nation against dangerous ideas. Of course that is not the way to protect the Nation against *actions* of violence and treason. The Founders drew a distinction in our Constitution which we would be wise to follow. They gave the government the fullest power to prosecute overt actions in violation of valid laws but withheld any power to punish people for nothing more than advocacy of their views.

I am compelled to say in closing that I fear that all the arguments and urgings the Communists and their sympathizers can use in trying to convert Americans to an ideology wholly foreign to our habits and our instincts are far less dangerous to the security of this nation than laws which embark us upon a policy of repression by the outlawry of minority parties because they advocate radical changes in the structure of government. This widespread program for punishing ideas on the ground that they might impair the internal security of the nation not only sadly fails to protect that security but also diverts our energies and thoughts from the many far more important problems that face us as a nation in this troubled world.

I would reverse this case and leave the Communists free to advocate their beliefs in proletarian dictatorship publicly and openly among the people of this country with full confidence that the people will remain loyal to any democratic government truly dedicated to freedom and justice—the kind of government which some of us still think of as being "the last best hope of earth."

THE PEOPLE'S FORUM

Rubin's Latin America

Dear Sirs:

The amount of knowledge of Latin America Morris H. Rubin was able to extract on his recent tour is almost as impressive as his ability to impart that knowledge and make it meaningful. Naturally, I read the Puerto Rico story with interest and appreciation, but I am finding the whole issue extremely worthwhile.

I don't know what your circulation for that issue is, but I wish it were more.

Luis Munoz Marin
Governor
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
San Juan

Dear Sirs:

Your Latin American issue was magnificent.

James P. Warburg
New York, New York

Dear Sirs:

As one who specializes in Latin American affairs, I write to tell you that Morris H. Rubin's report in the June issue is one of the most hard-headed, clear-cut, well-balanced, and thoughtful studies of Latin America I have seen in a long time. His presentation, which must have cost him many long hours of pondering, came out one of the sanest available anywhere.

Charles W. Anderson
Department of Political Science
University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin

Dear Sirs:

As one who has traveled widely in Latin America, I want to express my great enthusiasm for Morris H. Rubin's splendid report on our neighbors to the south. It is rare that one finds such expert reporting and perceptive interpretation in current writings on Latin America.

Thomas Haydn
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Sirs:

That was an exceptionally fine report on Latin America with its sympathetic treatment of a vastly challenging problem. I have written Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggesting that he read your report. Your June issue will greatly improve United States understanding of what is needed in Latin America.

Guy W. Finney
Burbank, California

Dear Sirs:

Your June issue on Latin America represents the kind of distinguished public service we have come to expect from *The Progressive*. I am unable to recall seeing anywhere, in the many publications I see regularly, anything that analyzes Latin America with such great clarity and such sharp insight.

Ronald Humphreys
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sirs:

That was a wonderful issue on Latin America—especially that splendid report on Cuba. How shocking that our mass circulation magazines like *Time* should be indifferent to the human factors involved. I hope greatly that the June issue of *The Progressive* receives a wide circulation.

Helen Mears
New York, New York

Dear Sirs:

Let me express my deep and abiding admiration for the marvelous panorama you have presented of Latin American conditions, political and otherwise. What a job that must have been—and done so quickly and so well.

Irvin Ashkenazy
Pasadena, California

Dear Sirs:

I compliment you on your June issue. Morris Rubin did an astonishingly comprehensive job in packing into one tour so much information on current Latin-American affairs. His report contains information that would take me perhaps weeks to dig out of Latin American publications.

Charlotte Phelps
Austin, Texas

Dear Sirs:

Morris H. Rubin's report, "Latin America: Dynamite on Our Doorstep," constitutes a challenging appeal to our consciousness to come to the assistance of all elements which seek a new freedom. This ably written document both reports essential facts which should shock us into action and makes ex-

cellent recommendations as to what we can and must do at once.

DALE PONTIUS
Roosevelt University
Chicago, Illinois

One Fault

Dear Sirs:

I have just finished reading the June issue from cover to cover. Morris Rubin has done a superb job of reporting and interpreting the critical situation in Latin America.

I find only one fault with Rubin's report. One of the most reactionary forces in Latin America, always allied with the tyrants and the oligarchs excoriated by Rubin, has been the Roman Catholic Church. It has been one of the largest landowners, and some of the richest men in Latin America have been members of the Catholic hierarchy. Rubin has bravely and justly denounced corporations like the American Sugar Company and individuals like former Ambassador Whelan. But his relative silence concerning the role of the Catholic Church gives a distorted view.

The Catholic Church is mentioned twice in the entire issue, once in discussing democratic Colombia and again in discussing Trujillo. The Church is described as a "force for social reform," and it is said to "assume moral leadership of the struggle against [Trujillo]." The picture of the Catholic Church as a moral leader against dictatorship and in favor of social reform and enlightenment is belied by the facts of history in Latin America. Just as Rubin describes the Communists in Venezuela as supporters, for their own reasons, of the extreme right wing opponents of the democratic Betancourt, with whom they are in fundamental opposition, so the Catholic Church at times espouses positions of enlightenment for its own reasons.

The timidity shown by Rubin in exposing the reactionary role of the Catholic Church is in sharp contrast with his courage in taking on American big business interests, the Pentagon, and the Central Intelligence Agency.

NORMAN BALABANIAN
Syracuse, New York

Population & Religion

Dear Sirs:

In your otherwise magnificent issue on Latin America, I feel that you did not give sufficient attention to the vitally important matter of over-population. On page four you wrote, "During 1960, Latin Americans, most of them already under-privileged, increased in population five times more rapidly than they increased their total production of goods and services . . . Latin America . . . is increasing now at the rate of 2.5 per cent a year—highest in the world." But then you immediately abandoned the subject, the rest of your article suggesting that the problem of Latin America was solely an economic one to be solved by financial help from wealthier nations.

A second point that you did not even touch upon is that the population of Latin America is Roman Catholic, and it is a well known fact that poverty is a feature of all Roman Catholic countries—Italy, Spain, Malta, Ireland, and others. Quite obviously a religious system which encourages self-reproduction and threatens with hell-fire those who try to limit their families by artificial means is directly responsible for the poverty that must stem from over-population.

The same blame must be attached to the Eastern religions which teach their congregations that self-reproduction is a virtue instead of an antisocial practice, in an age when over-population is said by the statisticians to be a greater menace to the human race than the nuclear deterrent. Traditional religious teachings that originated and made sense in a sparsely populated world should not be allowed thus to imperil civilization, but should be adjusted in the light of the prevailing conditions.

Why is this subject never aired, even in such freedom-loving publications as *The Progressive*?

ESME WYNNE-TYSON
Selsey, Sussex
England

Suggests Rubin Read Rubin

Dear Sirs:

Thank you for a factual and sympathetic report on Cuba. We seldom get this kind of story in the American press. With few exceptions, only the world outside of the United States offers the information that you brought back from Cuba.

But, please, how can you still condemn Castro after what you have written? Won't you re-read your article? If you do, you will have to revise your all-American determination to condemn because everyone else has, and not because the evidence warrants this view.

RAMON EDUARDO RUIZ
Northampton, Massachusetts

Cuban Enthusiasm

Dear Sirs:

Editor Rubin's report on Latin America is an accurate diagnosis of a "mortally sick" continent, exposing the central troubles which keep the patient down: illiteracy, poverty, disease, underdeveloped economies, and crowning it all, a dead-end street fate for the majority of people.

As time is running out—we have the world's highest rate in population increase—"slow pace reform" and "long term aid" imply a poor treatment for such an explosive situation.

On the other hand, the tremendous social and economic progress Rubin witnessed in Cuba can be explained only by that "intangible, impossible to evaluate statistically," the enthusiasm of the people who have now "a genuine sense of national consciousness" as they work for their own direct benefit.

The liberation of such energy and putting it to work is the only answer to our "mortal sickness." It is the greatest achievement of the Cuban revolution—and I would say it is unique in Latin America. It deserves a more understanding attitude from the United States government, even though the Castro regimen does not arouse its political sympathies.

The United States can play a leading role if its government identifies itself with the rising expectations in Latin America for social and economic progress, backing up needed reforms with a strong will and quick steps.

EDUARDO REYES
University of Chile
Vina del Mar, Chile

Cancels over Cuba

Dear Sirs:

I have just read and pondered your long and important article on Cuba (which for some undisclosed reason you call a "tragedy"), and I have decided after serious consideration to cancel my subscription to your periodical because of it. To my mind it reflects a terrible lack of moral judgment.

After describing at length and from first-hand observation the enormous improvements in the lives of the great majority of Cubans under Castro, after an outspoken description of the duplicity and malevolence of American policy toward Cuba, and the treachery of the CIA and President Kennedy in the abortive invasion, you seem always to come back to an implied "nevertheless" and the suggestion that Castro has been an evil influence in Cuba's history. You see the facts and refuse to accept them. You seem to conclude that we must negotiate with Castro and must not try again to overthrow him by war, but you never suggest—what would seem to follow from your own observations—that any man of intelligence and good will would naturally *support* Castro against a corrupt United States.

Or are you weakly suggesting that we have not had enough evidence on which to decide? If you are suggesting that there is any sensible reason for supposing that the United States will change its consistent and long-established record of exploitation of Cuba and Latin America, you are treating your readers as sanguine idiots, and I resent it.

Don't be such an incorrigible Pollyanna.

EDWIN HALSEY
Ajijic, Jalisco
Mexico

June Issue 'Shocking'

Dear Sirs:

The articles on Latin American countries in the June issue of *The Progressive* were shocking in that they made practically no mention of the factor that is most responsible for the unfortunate economic condition of these countries.

This factor is the unbelievably rapid rate of population increase. The present population of all of the Latin American countries,

save Bolivia, is from 2.9 to 4.8 times the population seventy years ago.

In view of the rapid growth in population of the Latin American countries, any "do good" efforts by the United States and others are doomed to failure. All they can possibly do is to allow a larger number of the unfortunate inhabitants to die of malnutrition and the attendant diseases.

Until the Latin American countries find some way of limiting their population growth there is no possibility of reducing hunger and poverty.

IRA B. JORALEMON
San Francisco, California

Castro Parallels Tito

Dear Sirs:

Your special issue on Latin America is superior in every sense. I would have some hope if every official and U.S. government policymaker concerned with international relations had to study and pass an examination on this issue of *The Progressive*.

My observations of Castro's Cuba last December and January generally support the affirmative points in your report. But I am not nearly so pessimistic as you seem to be about his Communist connections. It is important to remember that Tito's Yugoslavia did not became a capitalist satellite by accepting aid from the West that was refused him by Stalin.

The parallel between Tito's Yugoslavia and Castro's Cuba is not in any way farfetched. Stalin made the same mistakes that the Eisenhower Administration made, and with the same results. Yet, I know of no capitalist who believes that Tito has destroyed Communism and most certainly the Communists do not expect Castro to destroy capitalism.

The Soviet Union has learned to live with Tito and the United States will have to learn to live with Castro. Castro offers the West a great opportunity to get moving again. Any monopoly softens up those exercising it. Communism has challenged and broken the capitalist monopoly in this hemisphere. It offers an alternative which must be met through economic competition, not military competition.

HUGH B. HESTER
Brigadier General U.S. Army (Ret.)
Chapel Hill, North Carolina

Defends Stevenson

Dear Sirs:

Your June issue on Latin America is indeed valuable. I hope that President Kennedy will carefully consider Adlai Stevenson's report on Latin America, read the June issue of *The Progressive*, and read Karl E. Meyer's article in your July issue, "The Liberals and the New Cult of Power."

There is a correction that should be made, I feel, in Mr. Meyer's analysis. He refers to Adlai Stevenson's being caught in a fib. Stewart Alsop, in the *Saturday Evening Post*, June 24, "The Cuban Disaster: How It Happened," explains that Mr. Stevenson was deceived, believed that he was speaking the truth, was "understandably furious" when he learned of the deception, and "demanded" that there should be no more of "this sort of thing."

MRS. LORENZ HANSEN
Upper Darby, Pennsylvania

Opposes Medical Aid Plan

Dear Sirs:

You are still fighting the battle for a social security medical-aid program on the basis of condemning American Medical Association statements rather than considering the program itself. This is an easy path, but it does not increase our knowledge of the issues.

The proposed social security law (the Anderson-King bill) has the grave defect of leaving out of consideration entirely those who need help the most: the old people with no resources at all. As a means of solving problems of medical aid to the aged the program is a fraud.

The money collected to defray costs of our elderly would be gathered on the basis of a highly regressive tax schedule: a man earning $5,000 a year for himself and family would pay the same amount to support the nation's sick as an oil millionaire with his 27.5 per cent depletion allowance.

The program does not look to the future: it will make more difficult the expansion of medical aid programs to other segments of the population (crippled children, for example) equally deserving of Federal help. A separate health agency not connected to social security would be more flexible in this regard.

Finally, the Anderson-King bill makes no provisions for even a small partial daily payment for hospitalization for those who will be patients in a hospital for a long time. We do not have nearly enough facilities to support such a policy. If the measure passes, we are going to find a larger number of hospital beds occupied by these pensioners to the exclusion of many medically more urgent patients.

LEWIS R. LANG, M.D.
Calhoun, Georgia

A Mouse Named 'Freedom'

Dear Sirs:

"There is a little mouse that comes into our cell," our son wrote to friends from Jackson, Mississippi, "and we've named it 'Freedom'."

The days since our son Gene and five other Freedom Riders boarded the bus at the Minneapolis depot have added up to several of the longest weeks of our lives. He, and we, were prepared to face serious trouble —possible violence—a prison term of some kind.

The first step in Mississippi justice was fast. The six Minnesota Freedom Riders were arrested Sunday afternoon and sentenced at 3 p.m. Monday after a three to four minute "trial." The next steps were slower. Their luggage, books, and writing materials were returned to them on the following Thursday. Correspondence has come to a halt since the boys were put in striped prison garb—despite assurance that two letters a week were permitted.

Before Gene's decision to go to Jackson, we felt we had strong convictions about human rights and racial justice. But Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida were far, far away. Today Parchman, Mississippi, seems as impenetrable as any iron curtain. But it is a close, emotion-charged reality with which we are living. We try to keep in mind that Gene and the other Riders are dedicated to showing "courtesy, tact, creativeness, tolerance, understanding, and above all, self-giving love to everyone, in and out of jail."

Here at home we have a sharper awareness of what it means to be able to walk, to ride, to enter, to use public facilities which have no demarcation lines. Family meals, the out-of-doors, simple comforts become experiences to be savored because they are denied to many others—among them our 19-year-old son.

Our pride in these dedicated, courageous young people who have offered themselves as the price which has to be paid for simple everyday freedom—to ride, to walk, to eat where one will—cannot be measured—this in a free country which now, willing or not, must lead a world to freedom. God help us if we fail to put our moral, spiritual, and legal strength behind the move to open the jails in Jackson, Parchman, Tallahassee, and Birmingham where a little mouse becomes a symbol of freedom.

MARY JO UPHOFF
Minneapolis, Minnesota

Help Seneca Indians

Dear Sirs:

While we speak of settling disputes in Laos, the Congo and elsewhere, are we aware of the plight of the Seneca Indians? They are facing expulsion from their ancestral New York homeland because of the proposed building of the Kinzua Dam recommended by the army engineers for flood control. Last year Congress appropriated the money for the dam, and, according to reports, construction of new roads has already begun.

Have we adequately considered the alternate plan suggested by an independent engineering firm and Arthur E. Morgan, formerly chief engineer of TVA? It is the Conewango-Cattaraugus plan which would "discharge excess water from extreme floods northward into Lake Erie via the pre-glacial channel of the Allegheny."

Arthur Morgan states that this plan would give Pittsburgh total protection from floods, while the Kinzua plan would give only thirty per cent. Moreover, it would save the taxpayers an estimated $100,000,000.

It is not too late to right a wrong and refrain from violating the ancestral homeland of the Seneca Indians. Thus we would preserve the first treaty of the United States:

"Treaty with the Seneca Nation of the Iroquois Confederacy," signed on November 11, 1794 by Timothy Pickering, personal envoy of George Washington, and confirmed by a personal letter from Washington.

I urge *Progressive* readers to take time to write a letter to President Kennedy asking him to help the Seneca Indians, save the United States $100,000,000 and have a more efficient engineering project.

ELSIE R. RENNE
Menlo Park, California

Correction

Dear Sirs:

For the record, may I say that in my article on South Africa in your May number, the paragraph beginning "Furthermore . . ." and ending ". . . lonely position" on page 31, as well as the very last phrase on page 32, were inserted in your office, not written by me.

I want to record this because the "the Afrikaners' vicious racial policy" has not, in my opinion, reduced Africans to "abject bondage." Phrases like these are just what I wish to avoid in describing the South African scene accurately because I believe that both at home and abroad there is need for clear heads as well as warm hearts in assessing our situation here.

JULIUS LEWIN
Johannesburg, South Africa

Reconsiders

Dear Sirs:

After imbibing Mayer's nauseating intellectual concoction, "Eichmann in Israel," I decided to terminate my subscription for fear that future issues might treat me to a few more of his "dialogues." Why not a dialogue between George III and Patrick Henry; between Hitler and Churchill; between Jesus Christ and every monster in human form throughout history?

However, after reading your recent issue, with its letters of protest from equally outraged readers, I decided to stick. I hereby pledge a dollar a month donation for every future issue from which the name of Mayer is omitted. Let him peddle his wares in some insane asylum.

HENRY FRUCHTER
New York, New York

Education in Oil

Dear Sirs:

Regarding your editorial, "Sin of Omission" on the oil depletions allowance in the July issue, I think your editorial writer needs a little education on what the oil business really is. There is more to oil than the Texas oil forces.

The future of oil in this country depends upon the adventurous gamblers—the small independent producers. If we stop drilling, and many have already stopped, you, the consumer, will have to depend upon foreign oil. Is this what you want? If you think gasoline is now high, wait until we are dependent upon the foreign producer.

At the present time, only one domestic well in seven ever pays for itself; only one in fourteen ever makes a profit. The money we have for investment in new wells is from our depletion allowance. I hope that you will study the matter further and come to see more clearly the present predicament of the independent oil producer.

JACK D. BERRY, *President*
Thomas N. Berry & Company
Stillwater, Oklahoma

Tolerance for the Tolerant

Dear Sirs:

I wish to express my wholehearted agreement with Alan Paton's doubts as vented in his letter published in a recent issue of *The Progressive* regarding the advisability of unlimited freedom of speech. As one who lived through the beginnings of Hitler Germany, with the opportunity to see what the repeated "rubbing in," in speech and print, of Hitler's theories did to the German people, I wonder whether it is wise to let calumny, threats, and incitement to hatred go unpunished, even if no harmful action has been committed.

In my view the poisoning of the human mind constitutes the greatest possible harm. I admit that it may not always be easy to draw the line; yet the principle, "Tolerance for the tolerant, whether or not we agree with his views, but none for him who preaches intolerance," might be applied as a guide.

EMMA DARMSTADT
Los Angeles, California

Liberal Dogmatism

Dear Sirs:

Many "liberals" automatically rise up in anger when they sharply disagree with some person whose (liberal) opinions previously had been in comfortable accord with their own thoughts. At once there is a cry for a "truly liberal" approach. What is really sought is an orthodoxy, individually suited to the complainant's point of view; an orthodoxy no less rigid than Goldwaterism, which gives awards for labor relations achievements to the Kohler Company. This "liberalism," which manifested itself in several of the letters objecting to Milton Mayer's "Eichmann in Israel" article, is a type of dogmatism which often splits and makes liberal action ineffectual.

While I disagreed with Mayer, in nearly every turn he took, I certainly don't feel that he is in any danger of losing his credentials as a liberal. Nor do I feel that his publisher is wandering down an "aberrant path." In simple, liberal language—each is entitled to his opinion. Neither Mayer nor the magazine need be so soundly condemned on the basis of one clash of opinion.

The Progressive is the best liberal periodical published. Please do not cancel my subscription.

JEFF W. GOLDSTEIN
Madison, Wisconsin

Kempton 'Romantic'

Dear Sirs:

As someone deeply in sympathy with the integration movement, I found myself both annoyed and embarrassed by Murray Kempton's article on the "Freedom Riders" in your July issue. The problem of how white sympathizers with the Negro cause can offer solid help is an important and delicate one, but I do not think the answer lies in being patronizing and sentimental, as it seems to me Mr. Kempton was.

According to the article, the Montgomery Improvement Association is made up of "cooks and janitors and country preachers." A look at Martin Luther King's *Stride Toward Freedom* will show that the membership was —and undoubtedly still is—much broader than that. "He [Attorney General Robert Kennedy] pleaded with unknown colored children to cease their rides . . ." The college students I know would find "children" a fighting word.

It is questionable whether romantic musings of this kind help the situation in any way. Wouldn't a hard look at what has happened to the sit-in demonstrators and the Freedom Riders who have been put in jail, or a realistic consideration of all that needs to be done in the long pull ahead, be more to the point than talking about "the distance to the farthest stars"?

PATRICIA HERRON
Meadville, Pennsylvania

Freedom Riders Exciting

Dear Sirs:

One of the most striking features of the "Freedom Riders," as Murray Kempton aptly pointed out in the July *Progressive*, is that they are simple, honest people seeking justice through quiet resolution. Active insistence through passive resistance.

We have read quite enough about pantie raids, hanging football coaches in effigy, stuffing telephone booths and the like. It is exciting to find students doing something of genuine significance with dignity and courage.

JOHN E. GOW
Chicago, Illinois

Indispensable Tool

Dear Sirs:

If ever there was a time for the vision, the courage, the depth of thinking of *The Progressive*, it is now. When the press and television (with rare exceptions) slant the news, conceal facts, and dish out sophistry, it is heartening indeed to have the fearless, factual reporting of *The Progressive*. It is an indispensable tool for all who seek the truth.

D. R. SHARPE
Pasadena, California

BOOKS

The Smooth Deal

THE NEW AMERICA, by Karl E. Meyer. Basic Books. 211 pp. $4.50.

Reviewed by

Ralph K. Huitt

THOUGH it seems almost like ancient history it really was not so long ago that liberal writers worried about a tiny piece of real estate called "Wall Street." Today the principal source of their anxiety is located about three miles due north of there, in a few blocks of Madison Avenue.

In each case, of course, it is not the address itself but the influences in American life symbolized by it which matter. Wall Street stood for the inordinate control of finance capital over politics and the economy, and Madison Avenue suggests the pervasive sway over all our habits and attitudes exercised by the practiced manipulators of symbols.

In this brilliant and biting analysis of "politics and society in the age of the Smooth Deal," Karl Meyer examines the transition in the United States from "the politics of the country store to the politics of the supermarket"—a new politics suffused with the Madison Avenue point of view. He does not like the change.

Meyer dislikes "the cult of slickness in politics—in which, carried to the logical extreme, issues become slogans, leadership becomes play-acting, and the means of politics an end in themselves." This, he argues, is more than just a change in style; in the politician's preoccupation with a favorable "image," with its connotation of deception, there is "a symptom of potential corruption of our political system."

In the "new America" the rough edges are disappearing—politics is bland, minor parties are gone, regional and even individual differences are muted. "Moderation" is practiced to excess.

In a series of sharply etched essays, Meyer describes the symptoms of the change. One tells just how those personal letters from Senators are mass produced down to the machine-made signature. Another specifies the office furnishings which are the prescribed status symbols of each grade in the higher executive echelons. Still another is a clinically detached assessment of the uninspiring performance of journalism, his own profession. Only the Supreme Court gets a good word—for its judicial activism in a decade of political passivity. Any one of several of these chapters would be almost worth the price of the book.

The causes of the change are found in all those forces which have helped to bring conformity and uniformity to American life—the virtual prohibition of immigration ("the melting pot has turned into a pressure cooker"), the decline of regionalism, the triumph of mass culture. The success of reform has killed off reformers; the parties of dissent are succeeded by those extreme manifestations of overconformity, the beatniks and Buckley-ites. Nobody believes in Utopia any more.

One measure of the vitality of this book is the frequency with which the reader who likes it will want to say, "Yes, but—." For instance, Meyer likes and admires John F. Kennedy, and he believes the President will revitalize national politics unless the bad habits and attitudes developed in Washington under the Eisenhower Administration "blight the promise of Mr. Kennedy's New Frontier." Many who also like and admire Mr. Kennedy will remark that Kennedy himself pretty well personified the Smooth Deal Meyer describes, and that making Congress and the bureaucracy respond to him has always been a crucial test of a President.

One may agree that, except for civil rights, the boldest political proposals today are "warmed-over New Deal," and go further to think that the tragedy of modern liberalism is precisely that its ideas are used up—which might then lead one to wonder why the issues politicians *ought* to be debating are hardly mentioned. Meyer apparently is as fascinated by political "process" as the people he discusses.

And some will find it hard to share the nostalgia for the past which permeates the book, the American progressive's historic faith in an earlier age which was simpler and more heroic. One hundred years ago (a date Meyer selects for comparison) there was indeed a clear-cut political issue, which the American people were about to settle at the cost of a half-million lives. Fifty years ago an uninhibited regionalism was largely responsible for 130 lynchings in a single year. The last decade, for all its shortcomings, has produced more progress toward equality for all our citizens than any other—and surely the nationalization of values had something to do with it. Every age, as Dickens wrote, is the best of times and the worst of times. It all depends on which aspects of it one chooses to consider.

But most readers, I believe, will agree that *The New America* is an admirable job. The political insights are shrewd and original, the writing professionally polished and accurate,

THE REVIEWERS

RALPH K. HUITT, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, has worked as a consultant in the Senate offices of Lyndon B. Johnson and William Proxmire. MAX FRANKEL was a member of the New York Times' Moscow bureau from 1957 to 1960, and he covered Khrushchev's visit to the United Nations last fall. HENRY C. HART, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, is director of the University's Indian Studies program. He has lived and traveled extensively throughout India. PRISCILLA ROBERTSON is a former editor of The Humanist.

the wit keen but astringent because the author is not amused by what he describes. What is more important, he criticizes the new America unsparingly but without rancor; he is like a good surgeon who probes only because he loves the patient.

Kennan on Russia

RUSSIA AND THE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN, by George F. Kennan. Little, Brown. 411 pp. $5.75.

Reviewed by
Max Frankel

GEORGE F. KENNAN'S *Russia and the West* is the story of a kaleidoscopic, forty-year war in which Soviet Communists have seized important victories—often out of the jaws of bitter defeat—from smug, superficial, myopic, and essentially incompetent adversaries in the democratic nations. It is, therefore, an exciting, ironic history, entertaining even though chagrining. Written to be spoken, in lectures at Oxford in 1957-58 and at Harvard in 1960, it is brilliantly readable history, too—full of the wit, drama, comic relief, and epigrammatic recapitulation with which Kennan habitually leads audiences through the replays of championship diplomatic chess.

Great events, revealed through diligent scholarship and related by a superb story-teller—these are elements enough for any book. But they do not fully explain the vitality of this book. Its power and purpose are polemic. It distills truth from episodes of history which we have never understood and which the Russians deliberately and maliciously have misunderstood. It argues for a rigorous diplomacy that would champion the great moral issues of human conflict—issues, Kennan emphasizes, that have nothing in common with great moral crusades by us, the good guys, against them, the bad ones, but rather issues that require "a certain relativism" about enmity, as about friendship, which in turn would endow our diplomacy with a sophistication it has never long enjoyed in this crucial, continuing war.

A difficult concept? Hardly. "If there is any one thing we have been taught in these forty years of the existence of Soviet power, it is that it is useful and necessary, in a complex world, to have dealings with enemies as well as with friends," Kennan writes; or, again: "Just because you have an enemy and recognize him as such does not necessarily mean that you are obliged to destroy him or can afford the luxury of all-out attempts to do so."

One of Kennan's main preoccupations in this book is the Allies' obsessive demand for Germany's unconditional surrender in World War I. With this single-minded concession to the good-guys doctrine, he shows they fell victim to a passion of righteous nationalism that caused them to beat not only the enemy but also themselves. With all eyes on the battle but blind to its purpose and consequence, they refused to release even a prostrate, leaderless Russia from its obligations in the "crusade." And so they allowed the Bolshevik extremists to strike the posture of reason and peace, which alone accounted for their triumph. Equating Russia's weakness with wickedness, they drove her into misery and isolationism and destroyed the kindred Russian moderates just as with the same formula in Germany they destroyed the forces of moderation by visiting upon them a punishment conceived for the Kaiser.

Finally, in the most absurd aspect of the pursuit of insensate victory, the Allies sent their own troops into Russia's Arctic and Siberian wastes to bolster a phantom front against the Germans long after it had disappeared. Thus did they involve themselves in a bizarre adventure that makes the Cuban invasion of this year look like a brilliant maneuver. And thus, Kennan thinks, did the Allies ensure the final Bolshevik conquest of Russia, which had not been at all sure.

The incredible success of events in the years following Lenin's seizure of power consume more than half of Kennan's book, not only because he has mastered the period in recent years of scholarship but also because he seems convinced that they explain almost everything that followed.

That succession of events, from the alienation of Germany and Russia to their cynical alliance in the Hitler-Stalin pact and the start of World War II, was not inevitable but, Kennan argues, historically logical. The record he has completed of ill-conceived policy and inept diplomacy by the West supports this thesis. What is more, he maintains, the Allies learned nothing from the experience, fought the second World War, like the first, as a mere military exercise, embraced the Communists as total allies just as blindly as they had earlier dismissed them as total enemies, and again set out in search of peace with little appreciation of their diplomatic environment.

The Bolsheviks, on the other hand, emerge from this narrative as admirable realists, capable of discarding their own foolish notions (as, for instance, about instant world revolution), ready to seek "peace and friendship" when it suited their needs, and adept even at turning relative military helplessness into diplomatic virtue.

If we are tempted to think of our current jousting with the Russians as uniquely complex, Kennan does well to show us how early in the game there was established "that ambiguity and contradictoriness of Soviet policy which has endured to the present day: the combination of the doctrine of co-existence—the claim, that is, to the right to have normal outward relations with capitalist countries—with the most determined effort behind the scenes to destroy the Western governments and the social and political systems supporting them."

Nothing has changed since then to alter the Communists' own judgment that they and the Allies are enemies essentially at war. Kennan's plea for relativism and sophistication in diplomacy is not intended to deny that war, but only to give us a fighting

Told from the inside!

FOREIGN AID

OUR TRAGIC EXPERIMENT

By THOMAS S. LOEBER

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NORTON

chance to win it. What upsets him is the Americans' peculiar habit of segregating military war from diplomatic war and their "congenital reluctance" to entertain the suggestion that political considerations might occasionally take precedence over military advantage. What alarms him is the Americans' "curious trait" of unlimited optimism about the fortunes of a government adopted as friend or protege (and vice versa). What shocks him is the repeated reliance, by the custodians of our security, on information gleaned only from friends.

Kennan, who is now our ambassador to Yugoslavia, argues that these sloppy habits of mind and policy are both the results and causes of pitifully inadequate diplomatic techniques, which seem never to interest us. The task of diplomacy, he says, "is really one of style, of perseverance, and of ceaseless vigilance." Summit diplomacy, coalition diplomacy, separate war and peace diplomacy, and, indeed, democratic diplomacy, he shows, are incapable of sustaining these qualities.

From his history, Kennan says he has learned that coalitions are capable of deciding only what *not* to do, and they tend therefore to do nothing. Harried senior statesmen at the summit, he says, have flitted since Wilson's time from problem to problem "like bees from one flower to another," making it impossible to arrange for the day-to-day decisions that would give policy a consistency of style and methodology. What is more, as democrats, they have found their impulses "brutally negated by opinion at home" and by the lack of discipline within their own establishments.

Kennan's narrative ends with World War II, but, as might be imagined, he appears convinced that we still have not learned our lesson. The daily newspaper is evidence. There are new opportunities, he believes. More than most students of Russia, he blames Stalin's personality for much of that nation's malevolence and believes that the image of Stalin's Russia should "stand for us as a marker of the distance we have come." With enlightened diplomacy, he argues, we could reap advantage of the fact that Moscow, too, is now saddled with friends and allies. With skill and imagination, we might well choose to have two enemies in Moscow and Peking, rather than just the lone Communist devil. Again and again, he pleads for that certain relativism, apparently convinced that the rest of us refuse to learn.

"Let us not repeat the mistake of believing that either good or evil is total," he declares near the end. "Let us beware in the future of wholly condemning an entire people and wholly exculpating others. Let us remember that the great moral issues on which civilization is going to stand or fall cut across all military and ideological borders, across peoples, classes, and regimes—across, in fact, the make-up of the human individual himself. No other people, as a whole, is entirely our enemy. No people at all—not even ourselves—is entirely our friend."

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Aid for India

INDIA AND THE WEST, by Barbara Ward. W. W. Norton. 256 pp. $4.50.
INDIA AND THE UNITED STATES, edited by Selig S. Harrison. Macmillan. 244 pp. $5.95.

Reviewed by

Henry C. Hart

WHY SHOULD America and her wealthy allies provide the foreign exchange for India's current (1961-1966) five year plan? How should that help be extended? Here are two books directed to those questions, published almost simultaneously—and utterly unlike.

In *India and the West*, Barbara Ward has employed her lucid style to write what is surely the definitive argument for a flat commitment by the West to raise the billion dollars a year India will need to finance its current, and crucial, plan. It is definitive not because it exhorts or presents hitherto unknown information, but because it justly marshals all of the diverse considerations—historical and ideological even more than economic—on which the thoughtful citizen, or Congressman, ought to make up his mind.

Even in England, possessing the advantage of industrializing first, the era of capitalizing a basic industrial plant was an era of misery for the masses, of mildly explosive tensions for the nation as a whole. Marx, who missed the significance of manhood suffrage and did not, as some wealthy Americans allege, foresee the progressive income tax, thought the poor would get poorer until the big explosion. Lenin, who saw the poor had not got poorer in Western Europe and America, advanced a new explanation—imperialism had shifted the exploitation to the backward nations of Asia and Africa.

Barbara Ward is severely just in her assessment of the British impact on India. But she gives quite different verdicts on the political and the economic effect. Politically, careers finally opened to Indians in civil service, and the education provided to a new Indian elite in English-language schools created a modern-minded leadership—but only because, as she points out, India had the capacity, in its traditional culture, to honor learning, even to indulge new ideas. The culmination was a takeover of political power without destruction of the institutions or the ideals which could support the later advance to modernity.

It was on the economic side that the British impact fell short. Barbara Ward carries the interpretation a step beyond the attacks by Indian historians on the "drain" of wealth from India to England. She applies the criterion of preparation for takeoff into sustained economic growth, and by that measure she finds colonialism upset a static subsistence equilibrium without opening the way to any other. In that sense, clearly, Britain has a responsibility for seeing that the job is finished.

There is another sense—the ideological—in which the responsibility is even more America's. For though

RAY BRADBURY—"It is rare to find a film critic who tempers his criticism with love. I prefer reading Stanley Kauffmann's motion picture writings in **The New Republic** because I believe he has a great and firm affection for the medium that has too often been attacked by snobs and cynics. In America, there is no other like him."

ERIC BENTLEY—"At any one time, there are a few people who write entertainingly about the theater. Robert Brustein in **The New Republic** is one of these. The number of people in America who also write *thoughtfully* about the theater is seldom higher than three. Robert Brustein is one of these today."

GILBERT SELDES—"Robert Brustein is the best man now writing dramatic criticism."

THOMAS HART BENTON—"The function of an art critic is not, in my view, to set up definitive judgments about art, but to stimulate thinking about it. Frank Getlein in **The New Republic** has done just that for me."

GEORGIA O'KEEFFE—"I always look for what Frank Getlein writes on art. He states clearly and simply what he thinks about what he has looked at and I find it a pleasure to read what he has to say. I looked over a stack of old **New Republics** a few days ago and was amused and surprised to see how many I found opened to the Getlein page."

WILLIAM S. WHITE—"As a journalist I consider **The New Republic** must reading not only for my profession but for all people really interested in public affairs."

STEWART UDALL, Secretary of the Interior—"For years I have counted on **The New Republic** for ideas, for fresh and candid comment. I still do."

WALTER LIPPMANN—"**The New Republic** is growing in excellence and becoming a very necessary magazine to read."

KAY BOYLE—"I do not remember any film review of Stanley Kauffmann's which has not interested and impressed me... He is one of my great enthusiasms."

Other **NEW REPUBLIC** *"regulars" (in addition to Stanley Kauffmann, Frank Getlein and Robert Brustein) Feiffer, Mauldin, Robert Osborn, Gerald W. Johnson, John Cogley, B. H. Haggin.*



we have proved that the poor do not get poorer relative to the rich inside our Western nations, they are still getting relatively poorer in the southern, colored, ex-colonial half of the world. America once proclaimed an ideology for all men: freedom and equality of opportunity. There is still enough truth in Lenin's analysis of the encounter of the industrialized with the backward peoples so that the Communists can deride this ideology as a hoax. Indeed, the question comes home to us whether we still mean it. It comes home in the case of India most of all, because India will need more than we can provide casually, and yet India is equipped, precisely because of her favorable encounter with the West, with the prerequisites to use our help to transform her society in the direction of the ideals we share.

Barbara Ward's prescription is fairly specific. It is to make a decision respecting Indian economic development as boldly adequate to the need as was the Marshall Plan—"one of the greatest, most unsordid acts of statesmanship in the annals of man." The Marshall Plan "was not a minimum sum for a bailing out operation, but a considered estimate of the full resources needed to finish the job. This is the element that is wholly lacking in Western reactions for the Indian Plans . . . You cannot half-launch a plane or half-launch an economy." To avoid being too little and too late, all Western nations with a per capita income over $500 should join in an aid commitment of $1 billion a year for India, or one per cent of their national incomes.

Adequacy of scale and concerted effort by the Western nations (welcoming Russia, too, if Russia will take the challenge) are key recommendations in Selig Harrison's *India and the United States* as well. But the similarity goes little further. This book is drawn from the statements of eighty-eight able Indians and Americans assembled two years ago in Washington to give a lead to the future relations of the two nations, particularly as to Indian economic development and American aid. Harrison, associate editor of *The New Republic* and one-time Associated Press correspondent in India, has drastically pruned and rearranged the transcript to make an orderly book.

It is more as a document than as a book, though, that *India and the United States* impressed me. Its pieces have the freshness, but also the inadvertencies, of oral statements. In his introduction Harrison provides some of the book's most penetrating explanations. He tells us, for instance, why sympathetic Indian intellectuals criticize our concentration of aid to Indian industry in private firms. Most of those we aid are still controlled by a few Marwari families.

The central point Harrison makes leaves one dangling over a precipice. United States' policy should be shaped now, he warns, upon the possibility that constitutional democracy may fail in India. He rates the chance at 50-50. My quarrel is not with that speculation. Certainly India has not yet solved some problems that could wreck the constitution; the population-food ratio is one, and adequate taxes on agriculture another.

My question is whether we know enough, or can know enough about the alternatives to constitutional democracy—Harrison's "combination of political, bureaucratic, and military leadership" is certainly not the only, nor the worst possibility—to make such considerations meaningful now. And if we are to test future possibly undemocratic regimes as to whether we should continue aid, the United States deserves a wider test than is suggested here: "The case for aid, meaningfully stated, lies in the fact that only a sense of development taking place gives men hope for a better future, and that only this hope holds men together in political and social unity." Are we interested in aid also as a means of opening up individual initiative, political and economic, and keeping open that freedom to criticize the nation which seems so sturdy a check on aggression? Or is political and social unity our sole final objective?

I am not convinced that Selig Harrison has given us here his final word on the aims of aid. This is rather another question posed, but not run to ground, in an exhilarating and exasperating book of what is in effect informed, pointed, inconclusive conversation. The real reason for his emphasis on the test of solidarity to the neglect of the test of freedom of opportunity and of opposition is, I would guess, that he wrote this introduction fresh from writing one of the most incisive books on independent India: *India: The Most Dangerous*

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Decades. That book, not this one, contains his superbly documented warning that centrifugal linguistic states may bring the nation to a deadlock before it can develop.

Two of O'Connor

AN ONLY CHILD, by Frank O'Connor. Knopf. 276 pp. $4.50.

SHAKESPEARE'S PROGRESS, by Frank O'Connor. World. 191 pp. $3.50.

Reviewed by

Priscilla Robertson

"NOT HAVING anyone to teach me," says Frank O'Connor in his autobiography, *An Only Child,* "I learned only by pretending to know. I played at reading foreign languages and Tenth Century Irish, . . . at singing from staff notation . . . when I didn't know one note from another. . . . It is not a form of education I would recommend to anyone, nor should I ever get a degree in French, German, Latin, music, or even Middle Irish, but I still catch myself at it, playing at scholarship and correcting the experts, and sometimes a little streak of lunatic vanity that runs through it all suggests that I may be right and everybody else wrong."

One of the subjects with which he "plays" is Shakespeare, and in a way the story of his own life provides certain credentials. He tells us how, growing up in Cork slums before World War I he seized and hung on to every bit of culture he could ferret out, almost from garbage pails, so to speak. Such pointed recounting of how a literary boy can find what he needs anywhere makes it easier to imagine how Shakespeare grew in Avon.

O'Connor's early life centered in an extraordinary mother who, having spent her childhood in a Catholic orphanage, and having been placed out as a maid as soon as she was old enough to earn her living, somehow managed to read her first employer's copy of Shakespeare straight through. Later on young Frank got *his* first taste of Shakespeare amid the mixed bag of books he found in the homes where she did day work. His father was an arbitrary, self-pitying bandsman whose drunken bouts periodically drove the mother to the pawn shop.

O'Connor's schoolmasters, with a single exception, were brutal, ignorant, and usually utterly hopeless about the whole business of education. Since this boy, for all his day dreams of culture, did not care enough about what they taught to pass examinations, they shunted him off to a trades school. (Now he lectures at Harvard.) He escaped as soon as possible by going to work, where he was no more of a success. But it was the time of the Gaelic revival, and throughout the boredom of his workdays, the memory of his one inspiring teacher held open a slim way into the world of poetry, music and Irish politics. So, when he was fired from a drapery shop, he joined the staff of a small nationalist journal.

The political party he fell into was extremist, unhappy enough about the new Irish Free State's compromises with Britain to declare "war," and young O'Connor accordingly became a "war correspondent." Luckily for him this ended in his being taken prisoner, for his year in prison gave him a chance to think things out, and his effort to teach his fellow prisoners the Irish language was the first thing he ever did well. *An Only Child* ends with his release in 1924, when he was twenty-one.

His long immersion in Shakespeare's words and world led him to write *Shakespeare's Progress,* a study of Shakespeare's emotional development. By noticing, for instance, various occasions when Shakespeare used such a simple word as "all," he infers a kind of passionate intensity which then becomes a biographic fact. No more than other students can he name the Dark Lady, but he does manage to show previously unnoticed places where the dark lady experience affected Shakespeare's thought and expression.

Again, he argues forcefully that at least two plays, *Edward III* and *Two Noble Kinsmen,* should be added to the usual canon, one at the beginning and the other at the end of Shakespeare's writing career. These are small examples of "correcting the experts."

Where O'Connor makes a big break with tradition is in his picture of Shakespeare's progressive and unredeemed disillusionment with life. He agrees that Shakespeare was the greatest European writer of all time but calls him a failure as a dramatist because of his self-absorption and lack of interest in "character." In both early and late periods, according to O'Connor, he smothers us in subjectivity, with only a brief period of "realism" (*Romeo and Juliet, Merchant of Venice,* the Falstaff series) in between. Thus, as drama, *Othello* is "not interesting," and Lear "a failure." From an early terror of mobs, into a nausea toward sex, into eventual hatred of social values, Shakespeare moved, putting "the Almighty on trial for murder, and then faking the evidence." Nor was there at the end, in O'Connor's opinion, any of that "reconciliation" and peace with the world which is the common presentation of the *Tempest* period.

O'Connor's study is sure to flutter Shakespearean devotees. Could Shakespeare have made *Othello* more interesting as O'Connor suggests, if he had given Iago some personal motive such as revenge, rather than making him a pure agent of evil while giving Desdemona no power to fight back? Does O'Connor wish to tell us that we can enjoy reading *Othello* for its poetry but not watching it on stage? Our pleasure in these plays today, of course, is not in wondering how the plot will turn out, but is rather partly ceremonial and partly aesthetic; but it does seem that one of the functions of great drama can be the statement of great themes, and that players can be allowed to represent "forces" as well as personalities. When we remember Miranda's cry of happiness, it is hard to believe totally in the theory that the *Tempest* represents the exhaustion of horror. To wonder about such points, however, is not to feel ungrateful to O'Connor for having the knowledge, and the sensitivity, to raise them.


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